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FIXING EVER-READY: REPAIRING AND
STANDARDIZING THE TRADITIONAL
SURVEY MEASURE OF CONSUMER
CONFUSION
Eric D. DeRosia
In trademark infringement litigation, courts often rely
on consumer surveys that use the “Ever-Ready” method
to measure consumer confusion. Courts are
understandably careful to scrutinize consumer surveys
for ways in which their methodology might have biased
their results toward the outcome desired by their
proponents. This Article strengthens and improves such
examinations by empirically testing and improving the
Ever-Ready method itself.
The findings of four new empirical studies reported in
this Article indicate the faith placed by the courts in the
Ever-Ready method is somewhat misplaced. Seemingly
subtle variations in the wording of the Ever-Ready
questions have a consistent and surprisingly large
influence on the survey’s final results.
Fortunately, the four empirical studies also give clear
guidance on how to repair and standardize the question
wordings. Two versions of the Ever-Ready method—one
version to be used in surveys proffered by plaintiffs and
another version to be used in surveys proffered by
defendants—are defined and verified based on data
from the four studies. The two versions are “known” in
the sense that they are defined empirically and
published to the community, and “conservative” in the
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sense that they cut against the direct interests of the
survey’s proponent.
The standards set by these known-conservative
versions of the Ever-Ready method will empower the
courts and a survey’s opponents to scrutinize (in a
rigorous, consistent, and systematic manner) the extent
to which the question wording in an Ever-Ready survey
is slanted toward the proponent’s desired outcome.
Anticipating such scrutiny, experts will have a powerful
incentive to adopt the known-conservative versions that
are identified in this Article. The expected end result is
greater reliability for expert testimony, with a particular
emphasis on preventing parties from bolstering weak
cases with methodological artifacts.
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INTRODUCTION

“As every trial lawyer knows, the phrasing of the question will
determine the content of the answer by the witness. So also with
survey questions.” – J. Thomas McCarthy1
Most trademark infringement disputes in federal court hinge on
a single question: are consumers likely to believe the plaintiff is the
source of the defendant’s goods or services? At its core, this question
is about the “perceptions”2 and “beliefs”3 that are held “in the minds
of consumers.”4 As a result, both the scholarly legal5 literature and
the scholarly consumer psychology6 literature have explored the
topic of trademark infringement. This Article draws upon case law,
the scholarly legal literature, and the scholarly consumer
psychology literature to identify and fix a problem with the surveybased evidence that is often relied upon by courts in infringement
litigation.
Parties to trademark infringement disputes often hire expert
witnesses to conduct surveys that are designed to measure the

1 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND U NFAIR COMPETITION §
32:172 (5th ed. 2017).
2 Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting
Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 235 (2d ed. 2000)).
3 Rohn v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 3d 253, 265 (W.D. Mich. 2017).
4 KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression, 543 U.S. 111, 117 (2004).
5 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & David J. Franklyn, Trademark Surveys: An
Undulating Path, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2029, 2031 (2014) (discussing the uses and limitations of
surveys in trademark litigation); Jake Linford, Are Trademarks Ever Fanciful?, 105 GEO.
L.J. 731, 736 (2017) (applying linguistic theory to trademark doctrine and examining how
sound symbolism shapes consumer perception); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1843–44 (2007) (examining
trademark law’s shift away from consumer-centered protection);
6 See, e.g., Takuya Satomura et al., Copy Alert: A Method and Metric to Detect Visual
Copycat Brands, 51 J. MKT. RES. 1, 2 (2014) (proposing a way to quantify consumer confusion
between leading brands and copycat brands); Clifford D. Scott, Trademark Strategy in the
Internet Age: Customer Hijacking and the Doctrine of Initial Interest Confusion, 89 J.
RETAILING 176, 176 (2013) (explaining recent developments in Internet trademark use and
discussing how Internet trademark use “alters our theoretical understanding of retail equity
and customer lifetime value”); Femka Van Horen & Rik Pieters, When High-Similarity
Copycats Lose and Moderate-Similarity Copycats Gain: The Impact of Comparative
Evaluation, 49 J. MKT. RES. 83, 85–88 (2012).
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extent of confusion among consumers.7 These surveys frequently
play an important role in pretrial negotiations8 and at trial.9 The
normative appeal of such surveys is described by Professor
7 Scholarly reviews of court documents in trademark cases have yielded inconsistent
estimates of how often survey-based evidence is proffered to the courts. This inconsistency is
presumably due to the wide variety of methods used by the researchers. One study examining
the court records for fifty-four trademark cases that went to final judgment found that at
least one of the parties had submitted survey-based evidence in 57% of the cases. Graeme W.
Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 867–68 (2004).
Another study of 331 opinions in trademark cases found that courts addressed survey
evidence in 20% of the opinions. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests
for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1641 (2006). A follow-up study used the
same method to examine 139 opinions and found surveys were mentioned in 21.6% of the
opinions. Kevin Blum, et al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton
Beebe’s Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 2010 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 3, 30 (2010). Another examination of court records found that surveys were in
evidence in 16.6% of 533 cases. Robert C. Bird & Joel H. Steckel, The Role of Consumer
Surveys in Trademark Infringement: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 14 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 1013, 1035 (2012). Yet another study specifically counted surveys submitted by
plaintiffs in 126 cases and found that survey evidence was submitted in 34.1% of cases. Dan
Sarel & Howard Marmorstein, The Effect of Consumer Surveys and Actual Confusion
Evidence in Trademark Litigation: An Empirical Assessment, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1416, 1431
(2009). Although these studies yield a variety of inconsistent estimates, they collectively
suggest that in trademark litigation, surveys are commonplace but not universal.
8 Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 5, at 2050 (“We found ample evidence to suggest that
surveys enjoy a substantial life before trial as critical evaluative and leveraging tools. In
short, we found that survey use at trial is just the tip of the iceberg.”).
9 See, e.g., Medici Classics Prods. LLC v. Medici Grp. LLC, 590 F. Supp. 2d 548, 556
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Proof of actual confusion is generally shown through consumer surveys or
anecdotal evidence of confusion.”). Survey evidence is so commonplace that some courts make
an adverse inference when a party fails to submit such evidence in an infringement dispute.
See, e.g., Koninkijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Hunt Control Sys., Inc., No. 11-3684, 2016 WL
3545529, at *19 (D.N.J. June 29, 2016) (drawing an “adverse inference from [the senior user’s]
failure to present survey results on the likelihood of confusion”); Schiappa v.
CharityUSA.com, LLC, No. 9:16-CV-81617, 2017 WL 2210274, at *9 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2017)
(“[W]hile there is no requirement that actual confusion be evinced through surveys or other
data-driven research, Plaintiffs’ failure to produce any such systematic evidence is telling.”).
However, this negative inference is inconsistently applied. See Sandra Edelman, Failure to
Conduct a Survey in Trademark Infringement Cases: A Critique of the Adverse Inference,
90 TRADEMARK REP. 746, 754 (2000) (“The foregoing case law discussion demonstrates that
courts and tribunals have not been consistent or systematic in determining whether the
absence of a survey will count against a plaintiff or be treated neutrally, and when it is
appropriate to draw an adverse inference on the issue of likelihood of confusion.”). Some have
argued that adverse inferences are inappropriate. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“While some courts have drawn adverse
inferences against parties who fail to introduce a consumer survey, such an approach
attributes too much importance to survey evidence. Surveys are useful but not indispensable
evidence of the likelihood of confusion, and no inference on that issue should be drawn from
a mere failure to offer survey evidence.”).
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McCarthy: “A conscientious judge is distrustful of his or her own
subjective estimations of consumer reaction and welcomes some
accurate factual information on this score.”10 Reviews of case
records show that about two-thirds of the surveys in infringement
disputes are proffered by plaintiffs.11 Naturally, a plaintiff who
proffers such a survey typically intends to show that consumer
confusion is commonplace, whereas a defendant who proffers a
survey typically intends to demonstrate that consumer confusion is
rare.
The essence of such a survey is that participants are exposed to
the junior product in a controlled manner, and questions are asked
to measure whether participants think the senior user is the
product’s source.12 The survey’s results are proffered to courts as an
indication of how consumers have responded (or will respond) to the
junior mark in the marketplace.13 The courts are supportive of this
basic approach, and they frequently embrace such surveys as
probative of the likelihood of confusion among consumers.14
However, because a survey’s methodology can strongly influence
the survey’s results,15 the courts carefully scrutinize the technical
details of the methods used by the expert. Whether this scrutiny is
part of an opponent’s challenge of the admissibility of the expert’s
survey-based testimony or an evaluation of how much weight should

MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 32:194.
The approximation of two-thirds is based on the synthesis of a variety of sources. In the
cases reviewed by Blum et al., supra note 7, at 31, a total of 24 surveys were submitted by
plaintiffs and 13 surveys were submitted by defendants. Thus, 24/(24+13) = 64.9% of the
surveys in the cases they reviewed were conducted by plaintiffs. In a different set of cases,
Bird & Steckel, supra note 7, at 1035, observed 74 surveys submitted by plaintiffs and 23
surveys submitted by defendants. Thus, 74/(74+23) = 76.3% of the surveys in the cases they
reviewed were conducted by plaintiffs. In the cases reviewed by Beebe, supra note 7, at 1641,
there were 53 surveys submitted by plaintiffs and 19 surveys submitted by defendants. Thus,
53/(53+19) = 73.6% of the surveys were conducted by plaintiffs.
12 See Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 5, at 2037 (describing the methodology of surveys).
13 See id. at 2039–40 (explaining that trademark disputes rely on the public’s perceptions
of a mark and that consumer surveys are “virtually indispensable” for demonstrating this).
14 See, e.g., Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 475 (3d
Cir. 1990) (“Consumer surveys . . . are the most direct method of showing the likelihood of
confusion created by an infringing defendant.”).
15 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 326 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“An
extensive body of social science literature describes how methodological and other errors can
affect the reliability and validity of estimates about the opinions and attitudes of a population
derived from various sampling techniques.”).
10
11
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be accorded to the testimony,16 the courts have been especially
careful to scrutinize survey methods for ways in which they might
“bias,”17 “skew,”18 and “manipulate”19 the results of the survey
toward the outcome desired by the survey’s proponent. For example,
courts harshly criticize plaintiffs who use survey methods that the
courts believe have falsely inflated the estimate rate of confusion.20
When a survey’s methodology receives judicial praise, other
courts have shown a strong tendency to adhere to that dicta by
giving credit to surveys that follow similar methodologies.21 The
result has been a bandwagoning effect that nowadays constrains
practically all confusion surveys into one of two methodologies: the
Ever-Ready method22 and the Squirt method. Whereas the Squirt
16 See Simon Property Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (“The court need not and should not respond reflexively to every criticism by saying it
merely ‘goes to the weight’ of the survey rather than to its admissibility. If the flaws in the
proposed survey are too great, the court may find that the probative value of the survey is
substantially outweighed by the prejudice, waste of time, and confusion it will cause at
trial.”).
17 See First Data Merchant Services Corp. v. SecurityMetrics, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-02568,
2014 WL 6871581, at *5 (D. Md. Dec. 3, 2014) (stating that the survey questions repeatedly
mentioned the defendant’s mark which creates “bias concerns”).
18 See Conopco, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 242, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (observing
that the plaintiff’s survey “employ[ed] a methodology blatantly designed to skew the survey’s
results in favor of confusion”).
19 See New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Florida, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 195, 222
(D. Conn. 2004) (quoting Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 233 (2d Cir. 1999))
(noting that, with survey evidence, “inferences can be manipulated through ‘artful data
collection or presentation’ and exacerbated through methodological errors”).
20 See Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-01221, 2012 WL 2153162, at *11
(D. Colo. June 13, 2012) (“[T]he substantial deficiencies in [plaintiff expert’s] survey
cumulatively render all of his conclusions devoid of any probative value.”). Reviewing the
district court’s decision, the Tenth Circuit agreed, saying the plaintiff’s expert used methods
that “exaggerated the similarities between the two marks, likely increasing the confusion of
the respondents.” Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., 726 F.3d 1136, 1147 (10th Cir. 2013).
21 See, e.g., Innovation Ventures, LLC v. NVE, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 703, 721 (E.D. Mich.
2015) (“The [plaintiff’s] survey methodology is patterned after other surveys that have been
judicially scrutinized and approved by other courts.”); see also Valador, Inc. v. HTC Corp.,
242 F. Supp. 3d 448, 464–65 (E.D. Va. 2017) (“[S]ince this litigation-driven methodology
appears to be novel, it has never enjoyed general acceptance, been tested, or faced peer
review.”).
22 A note on usage: This Article refers to the “Ever-Ready method.” Although the method
is most often called “Ever-Ready,” e.g., Parks LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 863 F.3d 220, 232 (3d
Cir. 2017), the courts sometimes refer to it as “Eveready,” e.g., Stonefire Grill, Inc. v. FGF
Brands, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2013), “Ever Ready,” e.g., 24 Hour Fitness
USA, Inc. v. 24/7 Tribeca Fitness, LLC, 447 F. Supp. 2d 266, 279 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), and
“Everready,” e.g., E & J Gallo v. Proximo Spirits, Inc., 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1640, 1645 (E.D. Cal.
2012). Similarly, in addition to the Ever-Ready “method,” e.g., Kroger Co. v. Lidl US, LLC,
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method has been accepted by some courts but rejected by others,23
the Ever-Ready method has been widely accepted,24 with courts
calling it the “traditional”25 and “gold standard”26 method for
measuring consumer confusion.
Because the Ever-Ready method is treated as orthodoxy by the
courts, and because the fitness of the Ever-Ready method qua
method has not yet been refined or even empirically tested, this
Article turns a spotlight onto the Ever-Ready method itself. Part II
provides the background of the Ever-Ready method. Part III sets out
testable propositions concerning (1) subtly different variants in the
question wording for Ever-Ready surveys that have been credited by
federal courts, and (2) differential response effects for those
variants, with implications for a survey’s final results. To identify
variants of the Ever-Ready method, Part IV reports a review of
twenty surveys conducted by prominent expert witnesses. To test
the response effects of the Ever-Ready variants, Part V reports the
results of four new empirical studies. Collectively, the studies
demonstrate that although the differences between the Ever-Ready
variants may appear to be subtle and inconsequential, their
response effects yield a consistent influence on the results of the
surveys. The studies show that the response effects are so large that
choosing an Ever-Ready variant can easily sway a survey to yield
levels of confusion that are above or below the court’s traditional
threshold for infringement, thereby making a dispositive difference
in a trademark dispute. The effects are consistent across the studies
No. 3:17-CV-00480, 2017 WL 3262253, at *5 (E.D. Va. July 31, 2017), the courts sometimes
refer to it as a “procedure,” e.g., GMA Accessories, Inc. v. Croscill, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-06236,
2008 WL 591803, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2008), “protocol,” e.g., Stonefire Grill, Inc. v. FGF
Brands, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2013), “format,” e.g., Akiro LLC v. House
of Cheatham, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 324, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), “approach,” e.g., Hansen
Beverage Co. v. Cytosport, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-00031, 2009 WL 5104260, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
4, 2009), “design,” e.g., THOIP v. Walt Disney Co., 690 F. Supp. 2d 218, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2010),
and “test,” e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Houston Coll. of Law, 214 F. Supp. 3d 573, 593 n.108 (S.D.
Tex. 2016). These inconsistencies in usage have no particular significance.
23 See infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
24 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 32:174 (“A now-standard survey format used to prove
likely confusion in cases where plaintiff makes some products which defendant does not is
the Eveready format. This has become a standard and widely accepted format to prove the
likelihood or non-likelihood of confusion.”).
25 McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Granutec, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 198, 202 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
26 E & J Gallo Winery v. Proximo Spirits, Inc., No. 1:10–CV–00411, 2011 WL 5922090, at
*3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011).
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and robust to other methodological choices (e.g., whether the study
uses a so-called “memory test” or a “reading test”). These empirical
results indicate the faith of the courts in the Ever-Ready method is
somewhat misplaced.
Rather than simply cursing the darkness, this Article lights a
candle. In Part VI, the results of the four studies are drawn upon to
repair and refine the Ever-Ready method. Two “knownconservative” versions of the Ever-Ready method are identified: one
for plaintiffs and another for defendants. The two versions are
“conservative” in the sense that they cut against the interests of the
survey’s proponent. The two versions are “known” in the sense that
this Article empirically establishes and verifies their status as
conservative and makes that information available to experts,
survey proponents, survey opponents, and the courts.
Part VII describes a variety of benefits provided by this knownconservative approach: guidance for survey experts in creating more
reliable27 survey evidence, guidance for parties in meeting their
burden of proving their survey is reliable, guidance for parties
opposing a survey with rigor, guidance for judges in evaluating
survey methods with greater consistency, a reduction in the area of
ground contested in the “battle of the experts” that is common in
trademark trials, and a strong reduction in the likelihood that weak
trademark cases will be strengthened by mere methodological
artifacts.
With an eye toward applying the known-conservative approach
narrowly to the Ever-Ready method and, in the future, applying it
more broadly to other litigation survey methods, Part VII also
describes a cooperative mechanism and a competitive mechanism
that can be expected. Under the cooperative mechanism, this
research provides a new framework for a variety of independent
scholars to contribute to a further refinement and improvement of
the known-conservative methods. Simultaneously, under the
27 Throughout this Article, “reliability” is used to indicate evidentiary reliability in
alignment with the definition used by the Daubert court: “[O]ur reference here is to
evidentiary reliability – that is, trustworthiness . . . . In a case involving scientific evidence,
evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) (emphasis omitted). This is in contrast to the meaning of
“reliability” as it is used in psychometrics. See LARRY R. PRICE, PSYCHOMETRIC METHODS:
THEORY INTO PRACTICE 203, 203 (2017) (“Broadly speaking the term reliability refers to the
degree to which scores on tests or other instruments are free of errors of measurement.”).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

9

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 [2019], Art. 5

622

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:613

competitive mechanism, adversarial pressures will give parties and
survey experts a strong incentive to adopt the community-defined
known-conservative version of the empirical method. Part VII
concludes by identifying the contributions of the four empirical
studies to broader discussions in the scholarly literature about
scientific evidence in the courtroom.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE EVER-READY METHOD
A. ORIGINS OF THE EVER-READY METHOD

The origin of the Ever-Ready method, sometimes called the
“monadic”28 method, was a survey proffered to the court in Union
Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc.29 In the survey, conducted on
behalf of Union Carbide and its EVEREADY mark, participants
were shown the allegedly infringing junior product (a desk lamp
marked Ever-Ready), and participants were asked three openended questions:
Question 1: Who do you think puts out the lamp shown here?
Question 2: What makes you think so?
Question 3: Please name any other products put out by the same
concern which you think puts out the lamps shown here.30
The participant’s responses to Questions 1 and 3 were considered
together to determine whether the participant was experiencing
source confusion.31 Participants who specifically mentioned “Union
Carbide” in response to Question 1 were coded as experiencing
source confusion.32 In addition, participants who mentioned
flashlights or batteries for Question 3 were also coded as
experiencing source confusion.33 Such a response was telling
because Union Carbide offered flashlights and batteries for sale, but
the defendant did not.34 This coincides with the law’s anonymous
source rule, in which consumers “need not know the identity of the

28 G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1495 (E.D. Wis.
1987).
29 392 F. Supp. 280, 292 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 293.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 283–84.
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single source.”35 Therefore, Question 3 amounts to a clarification of
the participant’s response to Question 1.
Initially, the District Court disregarded the Ever-Ready survey
because the questions were seen as leading36 and concluded that the
responses were “equivocal on the issue of the product’s source.”37
However, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit reconsidered the survey
and pointedly praised its methodological soundness, saying the
survey’s questions were “not leading,”38 the participants whose
responses suggested they were confused “must be considered cases
of confusion,”39 and “the district court [was] clearly erroneous in not
crediting the surveys.”40
B. CURRENT ACCEPTANCE OF THE EVER-READY METHOD

In the wake of the Seventh Circuit’s praise, the Ever-Ready
method has become the orthodox method for measuring consumer
confusion. Surveys using the Ever-Ready method have been credited
by courts in every federal circuit.41 Surveys using the Ever-Ready
method have been credited by courts in a wide variety of contexts:

Tone Brothers, Inc., v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1203 n.11 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 392 F. Supp. 280, 293 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(stating that a similar question was condemned as leading by a district court in another
circuit, as the questions inappropriately “suggest[ed] an opinion of those interviewees who
had not formed one”).
37 Id. at 292.
38 Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 387 (7th Cir. 1976).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Caught-on-Bleu, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 105, 121 (D.N.H.
2003); GoSMiLE, Inc. v. Levine, 769 F. Supp. 2d 630, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Fancaster, Inc. v.
Comcast Corp., 832 F. Supp. 2d 380, 398 (D.N.J. 2011); Kroger Co. v. Lidl US, LLC, No. 3:17CV-00480, 2017 WL 3262253, at *5 (E.D. Va. July 31, 2017); Namer v. Bd. of Governors, No.
2:12-CV-2232, 2014 WL 5780539, at *15–16 (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2014); Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP, No. 1:09-CV-00318, 2009 WL 2407764, at *7 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 3, 2009); Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 1:09-CV02263, 2010 WL 1334714, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2010); Eyebobs, LLC v. Snap, Inc., 259 F.
Supp. 3d 965, 977 (D. Minn. 2017); Globefill Inc. v. Elements Spirits, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-02034,
2016 WL 8944644, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2016); OraLabs, Inc. v. Kind Grp. LLC, No. 1:13CV-00170, 2015 WL 4538442, at *1 (D. Colo. July 28, 2015); Flowers Bakeries Brands, Inc. v.
Interstate Bakeries Corp., No. 1:08-CV-02376, 2010 WL 3075318, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4,
2010); 3M Co. v. Mohan, 482 Fed. Appx. 574, 579 (Fed. Cir. 2012); and 3M Co. v. Mohan, No.
0:09-CV-01413, 2010 WL 5095676, at *14 (D. Minn. Nov. 24, 2010). The D.C. Circuit is an
exception. Very few trademark suits are brought there, and as far as I have been able to
discover, no Ever-Ready survey has been proffered to a court in the D.C. Circuit.
35
36
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surveys proffered by plaintiffs42 and defendants;43 in cases of alleged
point-of-sale forward confusion,44 reverse confusion,45 initialinterest confusion,46 and post-sale confusion;47 for senior marks that
are standard character word marks,48 stylized word marks,49 design
marks,50 and trade dress;51 for senior marks with a marketplace
presence that is commercially strong and well known among
consumers52 and senior marks that are commercially weak and not
well known among consumers;53 senior products and junior products
42 E.g., Bd. of Regents v. Houston. Coll. of Law, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 3d 573, 593 (S.D. Tex.
2016) (noting that the Plaintiff used the Ever-Ready method and found a net confusion rate
of 25%).
43 E.g., Fancaster, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 832 F. Supp. 2d 380, 398 (D.N.J. 2011)
(discussing defendant’s use of the Ever-Ready survey method).
44 E.g., Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Sycamore, No. 2:13–CV–00749, 2017 WL 1377991, at
*4–5 (D. Utah Mar. 2, 2017) (discussing the relevance and reliability of the Ever-Ready
surveys in connection with issues involving the look of the product).
45 E.g., Wreal, LLC. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-21385, 2016 WL 8793317, at *11
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2016) (explaining that Ever-Ready surveys have become the “gold standard”
in reverse confusion cases).
46 E.g., General Motors Co. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, No. 2:06-CV-00133, 2010 WL 5395065
(D. Utah Dec. 27, 2010). For a description of the survey’s adoption of the Ever-Ready method,
see Expert Report of Dr. Glenn L. Christensen at ¶ 64 n.36, General Motors Co. v. Urban
Gorilla, LLC, No. 2:06-CV-00133, 2007 WL 5813634 (D. Utah June 8, 2007) (discussing how
the questions are designed to address the issue of confusion as to source or origin).
47 E.g., Coty Inc. v. Excell Brands, LLC, 277 F. Supp. 3d 425, 442, 449–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(analyzing the use of a survey to show actual post-sale confusion).
48 E.g., Bath & Body Works Brand Mgmt., Inc. v. Summit Entm’t, LLC, 7 F. Supp. 3d 385,
396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (explaining how survey answers established affirmative evidence of a
lack of consumer confusion over the “Twilight” mark).
49 E.g., U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515, 535 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (noting approvingly of the use of the Ever-Ready survey method in determining
confusion over the “POLO” mark).
50 E.g., Denimafia Inc. v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-04112, 2014 WL
814532, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014) (referencing a survey of potential purchasers designed
specifically to determine whether there was any consumer confusion as to source, sponsorship
or affiliation).
51 E.g., E & J Gallo Winery v. Proximo Spirits, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-00411, 2011 WL 5922090,
at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011) (discussing Ever-Ready surveys used to measure trade
dress).
52 E.g., Fiji Water Co. v. Fiji Mineral Water USA, LLC, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1179 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (stating that FIJI’s consumer confusion survey provided substantial evidence that
actual consumers recognize the brand, based in part on trade dress).
53 E.g., Stonefire Grill, Inc. v. FGF Brands, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1045 (C.D. Cal.
2013); GoSMiLE, Inc. v. Levine, 769 F. Supp. 2d 630, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); National Distillers
Products Co., LLC v. Refreshment Brands, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 474, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Wreal LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-21385, 2015 WL 12550932, at *15 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 3, 2015). Some plaintiffs, when opposing an Ever-Ready survey from a defendant that
shows a low rate of confusion, have argued that “[t]he Eveready method only works for top-
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that have high54 and low55 competitive proximity to one another;
senior products that are sold to business customers56 and end
consumers;57 and senior products with wide national distribution58
of-the-mind, ‘well-known’ trademarks.” Appellant—Cross-Appellee’s Combined Reply and
Response Brief at *18, Globefill Inc. v. Elements Spirits Inc., No. 14-55456, 2015 WL 890550
(9th Cir. Feb. 19, 2015). The assertion is that because the Ever-Ready method requires
customers to self-generate the name or description of the senior mark or senior user, the task
is unfairly difficult if the senior mark is unfamiliar to consumers and lacking “top of mind”
awareness. In the larger context of a trademark dispute, this is a precarious stance for a
plaintiff to take; it necessitates arguing the senior mark is too unfamiliar among consumers
for survey participants to self-generate the senior mark or its user, while at the same time
arguing the senior mark is familiar enough among consumers that they are likely to believe
the senior user is the source of the junior product. As one court responded to such an assertion
from a plaintiff, there is a “tension between this critique of the Eveready survey design and
[plaintiff’s] argument that its advertising expenditures have created acquired distinctiveness
for its marks.” Citigroup Inc. v. AT&T Services, Inc., 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1888 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
In this sense, there is a “tension between [plaintiff’s] argument that its [senior] marks are
commercially distinctive for purposes of evaluating their strength but are not ‘top-of-mind’
for purposes of designing consumer confusion surveys,” id. at 1888 n.5. Likewise, when the
plaintiff’s expert in Simon Property Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc. asserted he did not use an
Ever-Ready method in his survey “because plaintiff’s . . . name and mark are not sufficiently
well-known among people who would be surveyed,” the court was unconvinced and stated,
“That explanation is completely at odds with [plaintiff’s] entire theory of this case, and it
amounts to an admission (or at least a confident prediction) that an Ever-Ready survey is
unlikely to show evidence of confusion here.” 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1050 (S.D. Ind. 2000). The
argument that the Ever-Ready method is inappropriate for marks that are commercially weak
has been credited by some courts and discredited by other courts. Compare Kreation Juicery,
Inc. v. Shekarchi, No. 2:14-CV-00658, 2014 WL 7564679, at *13 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014)
(noting that it was inappropriate to use Ever-Ready surveys when the mark is not well
known), with Joules Limited v. Macy’s Merchandising Group Inc., No. 11-CV-3645, 2016 WL
4094913, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2016) (finding that the Ever-Ready method was
appropriate). The scholarly literature does not have a full review of court opinions that
comment on this controversy, nor has scholarly consumer psychology research been
performed to explore how confusion might be possible for marks that are mostly unfamiliar
to consumers. This issue is outside the scope of this Article, and the controversy is worthy of
future research attention.
54 E.g., THOIP v. Walt Disney Co., 690 F. Supp. 2d 218, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying the
Ever-Ready method to similar shirt designs).
55 E.g., Denimafia Inc. v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-04112, 2014 WL
814532, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014) (noting that the Ever-Ready method was appropriate
when a jeans and shoe retailer used a similar mark).
56 E.g., Koninkijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Hunt Control Sys, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-03684, 2016
WL 3545529, at *6 (D.N.J. June 29, 2016) (approving a survey in a case where light bulbs
were sold predominantly to commercial consumers).
57 E.g., Citigroup Inc. v. AT&T Services, Inc., 1:16-CV-04333, 2016 WL 4362206, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (discussing the use of an Ever-Ready survey in a dispute regarding marks
associated with customer loyalty programs).
58 E.g., Coty Inc. v. Excell Brands, LLC, 277 F. Supp. 3d 425, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(discussing the use of an Ever-Ready survey in the context of producers of perfumes associated
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and smaller regional distribution.59 Outside the federal courts,
surveys using the Ever-Ready method have been credited by the
Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (TTAB) in cases of registrations
that are contested due to allegations of likely consumer confusion.60
Surveys that follow the pattern of the Ever-Ready method have also
been credited by Canadian courts.61
When evaluating Ever-Ready surveys, the courts have been
laudatory in ways that seem to suggest genuine esteem rather than
mere deference to the dicta of other courts. Courts have called
Ever-Ready surveys “reliable,”62 and “proper,”63 saying the
Ever-Ready questions are “obviously well-suited to determine
whether one trademark will confuse consumers”64 and “clearly
targeted at the relevant issue.”65
C. COMPARISONS TO OTHER METHODS

The most common alternative to the Ever-Ready method is called
the Squirt method.66 Although the Squirt method takes a variety of
forms, one of its essential characteristics is exposing survey
participants to the junior mark and the senior mark.67 The direct
with well-known, nationally distributed brands such as “CALVIN KLEIN” and “VERA
WANG”).
59 E.g., Order Regarding Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Defendant’s Experts at *1, Great
Am. Rest. Co. v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, No. 4:07-CV-00052, 2008 WL 7440300 (E.D. Tex. Apr.
21, 2008) (approving of defendant’s use of the Ever-Ready method in the context of a
neighborhood pizzeria).
60 E.g., Starbucks U.S. Brands, LLC v. Ruben, No. 78120060, 2006 WL 402564, at *11
(T.T.A.B. 2006) (finding that a survey that followed Ever-Ready was reliable to measure
confusion).
61 E.g., Kraft Jacobs Suchard (Schweiz) AG v. Hagemeyer Canada Inc., 1998 CanLII
14780, ¶27 (Can. Ont. Ct. J. Feb 5, 1998) (relying on a test that asked similarly worded
questions to those in the Ever-Ready system).
62 Nat’l Distillers Prods. Co. v. Refreshment Brands, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 474, 484
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
63 Fancaster, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 832 F. Supp. 2d 380, 407 (D.N.J. 2011).
64 Simon Property Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1049 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
65 Namer v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. 2:12-CV-2232, 2014 WL 5780539, at *16 (E.D.
La. Nov. 5, 2014).
66 The method is named after its use in SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir.
1980).
67 See
Jerre B. Swann, Likelihood of Confusion, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE
ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN 53, 64 (Shari Seidman Diamond & Jerre
B. Swann, eds., 2012) (noting that the survey questions and format of the Squirt method can
differ to a degree).
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and explicit presentation of the senior mark to survey participants
has been a lightning rod for criticism, with many courts saying it
creates “an association between the two products where none may
have existed previously.”68 Many courts have reasoned that by
displaying the senior mark to participants, the Squirt method is
suggestive of an answer to its question and thereby exaggerates the
extent of confusion it purports to measure.69
Surveys using the Squirt method are especially vulnerable to the
criticism of exaggeration when they are proffered by the plaintiff;
courts harshly criticize any survey method that appears to be

68 Riviana Foods, Inc. v. Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A., No. H–93–2176, 1994 WL
761242, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 1994); see also Koninkijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Hunt Control
Sys., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-03684, 2017 WL 3719468, at *33 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2017) (“Squirt
surveys can lead survey respondents to search for any connection, no matter how attenuated
instead of permitting participants to make their own associations.” (quotations and internal
citations omitted)); Elizabeth Taylor Cosmetics Co. v. Annick Goutal, S.A.R.L., 673 F. Supp.
1238, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“The proper test for likelihood of confusion is not whether
consumers would be confused in a side-by-side comparison of the products, but whether
confusion is likely when a consumer, familiar to some extent with the one party’s mark, is
presented with the other party’s goods alone.”); Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc.,
381 F.3d 477, 487–88 (5th Cir. 2004) (critiquing a Squirt survey for pushing “survey
participants to search for any connection, no matter how attenuated . . . instead of permitting
participants to make their own associations”).
69 E.g., Kargo Glob., Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, No. 1:06-CV-00550, 2007 WL
2258688, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007) (“[T]here exists a great likelihood that the back-toback presentation of the parties’ marks, followed by questions that asked respondents if they
believed the marks were related, suggested to respondents that they should believe that a
connection existed between the companies’ marks.”); Penta Hotels Ltd. v. Penta Tours, No.
B-86-089(JAC), 1988 WL 384940, at *38 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 1988) (noting that the questions
in the plaintiff’s survey “were clearly designed and placed in such a sequence so as to elicit
the intended response”). However, there is an exception to the idea that the Squirt method
exaggerates the likelihood of confusion. When both the junior product and the senior product
are found near one another in the marketplace, some courts have accepted the Squirt
method’s placement of the junior mark and senior mark near one another in a survey. As one
court put it, “[t]he Squirt design is ‘most appropriate where a product with a weak mark is
sold in close proximity to the alleged infringer in the marketplace.’” Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Zotos
Int’l, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc. v.
Flynt, No. 2:16-CV-06148, 2016 WL 6495380, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2016)). However, other
courts have criticized the Squirt method even when the products have close proximity in the
marketplace. For example, in People’s United Bank v. PeoplesBank, the court recognized that
the parties were direct competitors, providing the same services in the same “geographic
proximity,” but nonetheless found the questions in the Squirt format to be “suggestive,” and
“leading.” No. 3:08-CV-01858, 2010 WL 2521069, at *6-7 (D. Conn. June 17, 2010).
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“slanted”70 and “biased”71 in a way that is “self-serving”72 and
“stacks the deck”73 toward the result desired by the survey’s
sponsor. Consequently, courts that believe the Squirt method
overstates confusion have been especially critical of Squirt surveys
when they are proffered by plaintiffs, saying the method skews74 the
survey’s results toward the plaintiff’s purpose. For example, in
Water Pik v. Med-Systems, the senior user proffered a survey that
used the Squirt method in support of an allegation of
infringement.75 The Tenth Circuit rejected the survey’s findings
because, inter alia, the Squirt approach of pairing the junior and
senior marks together “suggested the very answer most helpful to
[the senior user’s] cause rather than eliciting responses as they
might occur spontaneously in the marketplace.”76
This weakness of the Squirt method is a strength of the
Ever-Ready method. The Ever-Ready method exposes survey
participants to only the junior mark.77 Because the Ever-Ready
method does not make participants “artificially aware”78 of the
senior mark, it can be assumed that participants who indicate the
senior user is the source of the product have self-generated that
response in an unguided manner. This non-suggestive character of

70 Native Am.Arts, Inc. v. Bud K World Wide, Inc., No. 7:10–CV–00124, 2012 WL 1833877,
at *8 (M.D. Ga. May 18, 2012).
71 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 4:10-CV-03561, 2016 WL 1743116, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
May 2, 2016).
72 Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co. Ltd., 609 F.2d 655, 660 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979).
73 I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 92, 109 (D. Mass. 2000).
74 See Bobak Sausage Co. v. A & J Seven Bridges, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-04718, 2010 WL
1687883, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2010) (“These questions appear skewed to obtain a desired
result, by linking [the senior mark] and [the junior mark] (and thereby implying that the two
are affiliated).”).
75 Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., 726 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 2013).
76 Id. at 1148.
77 See supra Section II.A.
78 Kargo Global, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-00550, 2007 WL
2258688, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007).
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the Ever-Ready method has been credited by the courts79 and is its
primary advantage over the Squirt method.80
A variety of other alternatives to the Ever-Ready method have
been proposed in the academic marketing and consumer psychology
literature. Professor Itamar Simonson suggests a questionnairebased method that uses a very mild form of deception to prompt
survey participants to describe the source of a product in a way that
reveals whether they are experiencing source confusion.81 Professor
Jean-Noël Kapferer suggests a method of measuring confusion that
uses special equipment called a tachistoscope to give consumers
extremely brief exposures to product packages.82 Professor Takuya
Satomura et al. suggests a method based on repeated trials of a
rapid perceptual choice task.83 Each of these innovative proposals
in the scholarly marketing literature was suggested for use in
trademark infringement litigation.84
Nevertheless, a search of federal court opinions reveals no
mention of any expert testimony using the methods proposed by
these marketing scholars, and unsurprisingly it appears that no

79 See, e.g., Order Regarding Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Defendant’s Experts at *1, Great
Am. Rest. Co. v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, No. 4:07-CV-00052, 2008 WL 7440300 (E.D. Tex. Apr.
21, 2008) (“A survey that utilizes the Eveready format, by displaying only a single party’s
mark and attempting to discern whether respondents are confused as to the source of the
mark, is much more reliable because it more accurately approximates actual market
conditions by ensuring that respondents are not made artificially aware of the other party’s
trademark.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
80 See supra note 52 (discussing of the controversial claim that the Ever-Ready method’s
requirement that survey participants self-generate their responses without presentation of
the senior mark creates a hurdle that is too high for senior marks that are commercially
weak).
81 See Itamar Simonson, Trademark Infringement From the Buyer Perspective: Conceptual
Analysis and Measurement Implications, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING. 181, 182 (1994)
[hereinafter Simonson I] (arguing that deception should be used because individuals may be
reluctant to admit confusion); see also Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Survey Method on
Likelihood of Confusion Estimates: Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Test, 83 TRADEMARK
REP. 364, 365 (1993) [hereinafter Simonson II] (discussing methods for ascertaining source
confusion with questions that use indirect tests).
82 See Jean-Noël Kapferer, Brand Confusion: Empirical Study of a Legal Concept,
12 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 551, 556 (1995) (“T-scopes are particularly appropriate because
consideration of trademark infringement relies on the assessment of the ‘likelihood of
confusion.’”).
83 See Takuya Satomura et al., Copy Alert: A Method and Metric to Detect Visual Copycat
Brands, 51 J. MARKETING RES. 1, 2 (2014) (arguing that this method best recreates the
circumstances surrounding purchasing decisions).
84 Id. at 10; Kapferer, supra note 82, at 556; Simonson II, supra note 81, at 364.
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parties have attempted to use them in litigation. Surveys are costly,
in terms of money and time, so it is rare for a party to commission
more than one of them. Previous research suggests that parties tend
to commission a survey only when the mark is especially valuable85
or the rest of the party’s evidence is not sufficiently strong.86 This
makes choosing a survey methodology a high-stakes decision, so
parties are unlikely to choose a method that is vulnerable to being
attacked as untried and untested, especially since courts have
specifically criticized past surveys for using “novel” methods.87 The
courts’ continued reliance on surveys that use the Ever-Ready
method88 suggests that courts are not looking for new alternatives.
Therefore, refining and improving the established and accepted
Ever-Ready method may be the best way to improve the reliability
of expert witness testimony about infringement.
III. TESTABLE PROPOSITIONS
In Daubert, the Supreme Court stated that, in evaluating the
reliability of an expert’s testimony, the trial judge must assess
whether the underlying methodology “is scientifically valid.”89 An
essential inquiry to assist in determining scientific validity is
whether the technique in question “can be, and has been, tested.”90
The methodological soundness of the Ever-Ready method can indeed
be tested, but such testing has not yet been performed.91 Of course,
85 See Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 5, at 2055 (“[The value of the mark] factor
implicitly reflects an evaluation of whether it is worth bolstering the strength of the party’s
position irrespective of the nature of other available evidence: when the potential loss would
be very harmful, the cost of obtaining additional evidence that may assist is worth
assuming.”).
86 See id. at 2067 (“Surveys . . . . are most likely to be commissioned when other evidence
in the case is equivocal.”).
87 See Wish Atlanta, LLC v. Contextlogic, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-51, 2015 WL 7761265, at *12
(M.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2015) (discounting the plaintiff’s survey method because the methodology
was novel and not endorsed by any other court).
88 See, e.g.,Coty Inc. v. Excell Brands, LLC, 277 F. Supp. 3d 425, 451–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(“[Plaintiff’s expert] used the widely accepted Eveready survey format . . . . Thus, the Court
finds [the] survey to be circumstantial evidence that each of [defendant’s products] at issue
here is likely to cause at least some level of confusion as to source in the minds of . . .
shoppers.”).
89 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
90 Id.
91 The closest previous researchers have come to testing the methodological soundness of
the Ever-Ready method is Professor Simonson’s use of the Ever-Ready method as a
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the Ever-Ready method is frequently used by expert witnesses in
litigation92 and marketing scholars in the academic marketing
literature,93 but these applications of the method do not directly test
its soundness. Considering the importance of the Ever-Ready
method to trademark law, such testing is long overdue. Testing and
improving the evidentiary reliability of the Ever-Ready method
requires a systematic empirical inquiry. This Article presents the
results of such an inquiry.
The Article focuses on two testable propositions. The first
proposition involves the nature of the Ever-Ready method itself.
The second involves the influence of the Ever-Ready method on
survey results.
As a starting foothold in improving the Ever-Ready method, this
Article focuses on Question 1, i.e., “Who do you think puts out the
lamp shown here?” in the original Ever-Ready formulation.
Question 1 deserves that focus because it is directly designed to
detect confusion, whereas Questions 2 and 3 are essentially
clarifications of the consumer’s response to Question 1.
Furthermore, because it is asked first, Question 1 sets the frame
and foundation for the other Ever-Ready questions.
A. VARIANTS OF THE EVER-READY METHOD

The Ever-Ready method has been conceived of as a single,
uniform approach. The courts commonly refer to it as “the”94
Ever-Ready method. As commentators describe it, “Ever-Ready has
been so often approved that material variants are rarely
benchmark for comparison against the proposed method described in Simonson II, supra note
81. The study showed the Ever-Ready method identified levels of confusion that were
sometimes higher, sometimes approximately equal, and sometimes lower than other methods
such as the Squirt method and Professor Simonson’s proposed alternate method, id. at 380.
However, Professor Simonson did not apply those results to evaluating or improving the
Ever-Ready method.
92 See supra notes 41–58 and accompanying text.
93 E.g., Steffen Herm & Jana Möller, Brand Identification by Product Design: The Impact
of Evaluation Mode and Familiarity, 31 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 1084, 1088 (2014) (using the
Ever-Ready method to determine confusion caused by similar brand design); Eric D. DeRosia
et al., Sophisticated but Confused: The Impact of Brand Extension and Motivation on Source
Confusion, 28 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING. 457, 470 (2011) (applying Ever-Ready to determine
the impact of consumer motivation and brand extension by competitors on consumer
confusion).
94 E.g., Parks LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 863 F.3d 220, 232 (3d Cir. 2017).
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encountered”95 and “there is near-consensus on the appropriate way
to ask [Ever-Ready] questions.”96
Recently, however, Professor Jacob Jacoby has pointed out the
Ever-Ready questions are not so uniform as previously thought,
saying the Ever-Ready method “has come into widespread use, but
with a number of variations, including subtle changes in the specific
wording of questions.”97
Perhaps such variations are to be expected. The Ever-Ready
method has been used for more than forty years, and it may have
morphed or changed over time. The question wording an expert uses
in a given survey might be influenced by a variety of factors such as
praise/criticism from previous courts, criticism of opposing experts,
standardized wordings offered by commentators, and adaptations
necessary to fit the case at hand. Question wordings might also be
influenced by each expert’s idiosyncratic communication style.
Therefore, the first proposition of this Article is that in practice,
the Ever-Ready method has splintered into many variants. In that
sense, it is proposed here that no single, uniform “Ever-Ready
method” currently exists. Instead, the Ever-Ready method as it is
currently constituted is best described as a collection of seemingly
similar question wordings that have been submitted to the courts
under the “Ever-Ready” banner. In Part IV, this first proposition
will be tested with a review of survey-based testimony in a variety
of trademark cases.
B. RESPONSE EFFECTS OF THE EVER-READY VARIANTS

If the Ever-Ready method has split into variants, are some of
them better than others in terms of creating reliable evidence? Have
some of the variants gradually evolved and worked themselves
pure? Are some of the variants producing evidence that is leading
the courts astray?
The variants of the Ever-Ready method can be viewed as
alternate techniques for measuring consumer confusion. From the
perspective of survey methodology and psychometrics, the
SWANN, supra note 67, at 58.
Matthew B. Kugler, The Materiality of Sponsorship Confusion, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1911, 1939 (2017).
97 JACOB JACOBY, TRADEMARK SURVEYS: DESIGNING, IMPLEMENTING, AND EVALUATING
SURVEYS 561 (2013).
95
96
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measurement of psychological phenomena, a survey measure that
has a persistent and artificial influence on its result, e.g.,
consistently increasing or decreasing the rate of confusion that is
observed when the measures of all the survey participants are
aggregated together, can be described as having a “response
effect.”98 As Professor Norman Bradburn has noted:
It is clear from the [survey methodology] literature that
response effects from whatever sources can make
substantial contributions to the variance in responses
to surveys and serious investigators need to give at least
as much, if not more, attention to them as they do to
problems of sampling error and nonresponse bias . . . .
[W]e must . . . test out their possible effects whenever
possible.99
An analysis of response effects is essential to determining which
variants of the Ever-Ready method yield the most reliable evidence.
1. The Legal Perspective.
Even without using the phrase “response effects,” the courts are
highly sensitive to the possibility, and they have anticipated a
variety of causes for response effects in surveys. Most judicial
criticisms of the wording of survey questions can be roughly
categorized as following the standards of direct witness
examination at trial. Adopting this perspective is sensible. Asking
questions in a survey to elicit the opinions of participants is clearly
analogous to asking questions in a trial to elicit the testimony of
witnesses. Indeed, one of the justifications courts have given for
considering survey-based evidence is that surveys are a direct and
efficient substitute for calling many customers to testify as
witnesses.100 The current standards of witness examination are the
98 Uwe Engel, Survey Modes and Response Effects, in IMPROVING SURVEY METHODS:
LESSONS FROM RECENT RESEARCH 15, 17 (Uwe Engel et al. eds., 2015); see also ROGER
TOURANGEAU ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SURVEY RESPONSE 2 (2000) (“[A]nswers to [survey]
questions are prone to a variety of well-documented response effects – differences in survey
outcomes that reflect seemingly irrelevant procedural details such as the order in which the
answer categories are presented.”) (emphasis in original).
99 Norman M. Bradburn, Response Effects, in HANDBOOK OF SURVEY RESEARCH 289, 318
(Peter H. Rossi et al. eds., 1st ed. 1983).
100 E.g., Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n v. UHS of Del. Inc., No.1:09-CV-07935, 2010 WL
2732349, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2010) (“[E]vidence of customer confusion is usually, and more
persuasively, presented in the aggregate in the form of consumer surveys and not in the form
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result of careful consideration over many generations of how best to
obtain accurate testimony by asking questions, so the court’s
application of the standards of examination—particularly as to the
question’s form—is a reasonable way to approach the evaluation of
survey questions.
The cause for response effects that is most commonly anticipated
by courts is questions that are leading or suggestive. Judicial
concerns about leading survey questions go beyond the popular
heuristic that leading questions are defined as yes or no questions
or, more broadly, questions that mention potential responses.101
Instead, courts are concerned about the more fundamental
definition of leading questions: “Questions . . . which so suggest the
specific tenor of the reply as desired by counsel that such a reply is
likely to be given irrespective of an actual memory,”102 in the sense
that “an ordinary witness would get the impression that the
questioner desired one answer rather than another.”103 In a trial
setting, leading questions are not permitted during direct
examination,104 in part because “a friendly or pliant witness”105 may
follow the examiner’s lead, allowing the examiner to shape the
testimony to the desired result.106 Similarly, in a survey setting,
courts may criticize survey questions as leading or suggestive if
their wording may shape survey answers toward the responses that
are desired by the survey’s sponsor.
of individual testimony by individual consumers.”). Despite the analogous similarities, it
should be noted that survey participants are not witnesses. Their statements are not sworn,
there is no cross-examination, and the common standard of survey research is to not inform
respondents of the study’s purposes to avoid influencing on their answers. Furthermore, in
contrast to the objectionable nature of opinion testimony from lay witnesses, see FED. R. EVID.
701, participants in surveys may offer their opinions because, of course, the opinions of
consumers are the very issue of judicial interest. Therefore, when the responses of survey
participants are accepted into evidence and considered by fact finders, survey participants
can be thought of as quasi-witnesses.
101 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 769 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) (noting that the general principal against leading questions is to
distinguish between questions which will taint a witness’s memory of an event and those that
will not).
102 Id. (emphasis in original).
103 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 6, at 17 (7th ed. 2013).
104 FED. R. EVID. 611(C).
105 BROUN ET AL., supra note 103, § 6, at 17.
106 San Antonio & A.P. Ry. Co. v. Hammon, 92 Tex. 509, 514 (Tex. 1899) (noting that a
leading question “enables the examiner to lead even an honest witness in such manner as to
give to the testimony a false color, and, it may be, to grossly distort it”).
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Survey questions have been called leading and suggestive by the
courts for a variety of specific reasons. Courts criticize questions as
leading if they appear to directly suggest the response that would
be desirable to the survey’s sponsor.107 Likewise, courts have said
survey questions are leading if they suggest a response that would
not otherwise have occurred to the participants.108 Courts have also
found questions to be leading if they appear to suggest a response
that is objectively correct,109 if the questions assume or supply facts
that mislead survey participants,110 or if the questions appear to be
unbalanced or biased toward the survey’s sponsor.111 Some courts
have embraced a nuanced view of the degree or extent to which a

107 E.g., Bobak Sausage Co. v. A & J Seven Bridges, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-04718, 2010 WL
1687883, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2010) (“These [leading] questions appear skewed to obtain
a desired result, by linking [the senior] products and [the junior] events (and thereby implying
that the two are affiliated) and also by using ‘likely’ to imply the answer to the question.”);
CKE Rest. v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1144–45 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“In
Plaintiffs’ survey, the questions were unfairly framed as to beg the results that Plaintiffs
ultimately received . . . [b]y providing the consumers with the suggested response, Plaintiffs
increased the likelihood of biased results.”).
108 E.g., Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 2004) (“A
survey question that begs its answer by suggesting a link between plaintiff and defendant
cannot be a true indicator of the likelihood of consumer confusion.”); E & J Gallo Winery v.
Proximo Spirits, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-00411, 2011 WL 5922090, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011)
(noting that the survey’s “question is not neutral, but ‘strongly suggests a possibility that
might not have occurred to the interviewees – the products are made by the same company.’”).
109 E.g., Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc. v. Nutro Prods., Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1204 (D. Kan.
2003) (“Some questions on the survey used leading language, and thus suggested to the
respondent that a particular choice was expected. Particularly, Question 6, the sole closedended question, failed to include the phrase ‘if any,’ although the open-ended questions used
that phrase. Question 6 thus suggested that one of the stated choices was correct.”); Kargo
Glob., Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, No. 1:06-CV-00550, 2007 WL 2258688, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007) (“[T]here exists a great likelihood that the back-to-back presentation
of the parties’ marks, followed by questions that asked respondents if they believed the marks
were related, suggested to respondents that they should believe that a connection existed
between the companies’ marks.”) (emphasis in original).
110 E.g., Valador, Inc. v. HTC Corp., 242 F. Supp. 3d 448, 466 (E.D. Va. 2017) (“[T]he
survey’s questions do not accurately reflect how the parties use their . . . marks in commerce;
. . . . In other words, the survey feeds respondents a false, suggestive premise, that the [marks]
are more similar than they actually are.”); Hartle v. FirstEnergy Generation Corp., No. 2:08CV--01019, 2014 WL 1317702, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014) (finding that information given
to survey participants that “is not accurate” is “fatal to the reliability of the survey”).
111 E.g., Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 558, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“[M]any of [plaintiff’s expert’s] questions were leading in the sense that they directed the
respondents [sic] attention to the similarities between the parties’ marks.”).
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question is leading,112 referring to some questions as “slightly
leading,”113 “somewhat leading,”114 and “highly leading.”115
Furthermore, courts have criticized survey questions for reasons
akin to common objections to witness examination at trial. As in
trial, where courts sustain an “asked and answered” objection if the
examining attorney’s repetition of a question might signal to the
witness that the testimony already offered is somehow unacceptable
and should be changed,116 so too the courts have criticized surveys
that ask many variations of the same question117 or probe a
respondent’s initial responses too often with questions such as,
“What else?”118 The objections of “compound question” and “vague
question” at trial are designed to protect witnesses from confusion
and protect juries from being confused or mislead by testimony;
courts have applied the same concerns to survey questions, finding
them to be improper if they are compound119 or vague.120 Similar to

112 E.g., Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-01221, 2012 WL 2153162, at *9 (D.
Colo. June 13, 2012) (“When evaluating the objectivity of a survey, a court must consider the
degree of suggestiveness of every survey question.”).
113 Shell Trademark Mgmt. B.V. v. Warren Unilube, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 884, 893 (S.D.
Tex. 2011).
114 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. 24/7 Tribeca Fitness, LLC., 447 F. Supp. 2d 266, 281
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
115 Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Menard, Inc., No. 1:01-CV-09843, 2003 WL 168642, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2003); see also E.T. Browne Drug Co., Inc. v. Cococare Prods., Inc., No. 2:03CV-05442, 2006 WL 2683024, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2006) (noting that Plaintiff’s survey “was
not objective because it asked very leading questions”).
116 The typical rationale for upholding an “asked and answered” objection is to avoid
wasting the court’s time with evidence that is entirely cumulative, but another rationale is
that repeated questions may influence testimony. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6:63, at 448 (3d ed. 2007) (“Sometimes the questioner
drums away too hard on the witness, putting the same question time and again in hope of
forcing the desired response.”); WIGMORE, supra note 101, § 782, at 183 (explaining that this
process “savors of intimidation and browbeating”).
117 See American Home Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 871 F. Supp. 739, 748 (D.N.J.
1994) (“[T]he Court finds that this repetitive manner of questioning . . . produced results that
cannot be relied upon.”).
118 See Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms.,
Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The technique of punctuating open-ended questions
with repeated probes is questionable.”).
119 See Potts v. Hamilton, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (“The compound
questions contain two or more elements, making it impossible to determine which element
the respondent addressed in his or her response.”), rev’d on other grounds, Potts v. Zettel, 220
F. App’x 559 (9th Cir. 2007).
120 See Merisant Co. v. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 315, 328 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(stating that the plaintiff’s survey “asks a general, vague and potentially irrelevant question,”
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the objection of “calls for speculation or conjecture,” courts are
sensitive to question wordings that prompt survey participants to
speculate rather than report their actual beliefs. In particular, for
surveys proffered by plaintiffs, courts have been critical of failures
to take steps to reduce guessing in survey answers because the
effect of increased guessing is likely to be an exaggeration in the
rate of confusion observed in the study and, therefore, an advantage
to the plaintiff.121 Conversely, some courts have been critical of
surveys conducted by defendants which emphasized too strongly
that participants should not guess because the effect of such
inhibition of guessing is likely to be a decrease in the rate of
confusion observed in the study and, therefore, an advantage to the
defendant.122
In essence, then, the courts have indeed criticized survey
questions when the courts expected the wording would yield
response effects. The courts’ underlying theoretical model for
anticipating response effects appears to be based on the standards
for witness examination, with the courts’ criticisms aligning to the
common objections to question form: “leading question,” “asked and
answered,” “compound question,” “vague question,” and “calls for
speculation or conjecture.” The courts have moved, at least in the
context of leading questions, beyond the mere existence of a
response effect to an acknowledgement that a response effect can be
considered in terms of its degree or severity.

and “[i]n this regard, it is impossible for the Court to know upon what basis the a [sic] certain
portion of the respondents to the [plaintiff’s] poll arrived at this conclusion”).
121 Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 561, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(stating that the results of the plaintiff’s survey are “likely to be inflated because the survey
. . . asked leading questions without giving instructions against guessing”); Competitive Edge,
Inc. v. Staples, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“Some respondents to a survey
will not have an opinion on a question asked, which can result in a respondent guessing as to
the ‘right’ answer . . . . The survey’s reliability is significantly compromised by its failure to .
. . allow for ‘don’t know’ responses.” (internal citations omitted)); Shari Seidman Diamond,
Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 359,
390 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., 3d ed. 2011) (“By signaling to the respondent that it is appropriate
not to have an opinion, the question reduces the demand for an answer and, as a result, the
inclination to hazard a guess just to comply.”).
122 See McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Merisant Co., No. 3:04-CV-01090,, 2004 WL 3316380, at *20
(D.P.R. July 29, 2004) (“Following the strong ‘admonishment’ to respond only if they knew
the correct answer, and not to guess, participants in [defendant’s] survey overwhelmingly
indicated that they did not know ‘who or what brand or company makes or puts out’ the
product they had just seen.”).
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2. The Psychometric Perspective.
The field of psychometrics in survey research is also deeply
concerned about response effects in survey questions, but the field
anticipates response effects from a very different perspective than
the courts. In the scholarly literature on survey methodology and
psychometrics, the act of answering a survey question has been
conceptualized from two theoretical perspectives.
First, answering a survey question is seen as a cognitive process,
in the sense that the participant must interpret the meaning of the
question, formulate an opinion, and determine how to report that
opinion.123 Interpreting the meaning of the questions could involve
not only the words’ literal, denotive meanings but also their implied,
connotative meanings. Formulating an opinion may involve
retrieving a previous judgment from memory or creating a new
judgment in response to the survey’s request.124 Determining how
to report the opinion may involve editing the response to fit the
alternatives offered in the survey or creating a short narrative
response. Portions of the cognitive process of answering a survey
question are automatic (i.e., happening quickly, outside the
respondent’s awareness, and beyond the respondent’s control),125
while other portions are conscious (i.e., happening only with effort,
within the respondent’s awareness, and fully under voluntary
control).126
Second, answering a survey question is seen as a social
encounter, in the sense that the respondent is having a social
interaction with the unseen author of the questionnaire.127
123 See
Roger Tourangeau & Norman M. Bradburn, The Psychology of Survey
Response, in HANDBOOK OF SURVEY RESEARCH 315, 318 (Peter V. Marsden & James D.
Wright, eds., 2d ed. 2010) (“[T]he various models of the survey response process . . . agree on
the major processes respondents go through (or ought to go through) in answering questions.
These phases are: (1) comprehending the meaning of the question, (2) retrieving relevant
information; (3) formulating an answer; (4) formatting that answer to meet the requirements
of the question and perhaps ‘editing’ it to satisfy other motives the respondent may have”).
124 Id.
125 E.g., id. at 321 (“The process of retrieval has both automatic and controlled components.
The automatic portion (which happens outside our awareness and is beyond our control)
involve one memory or idea bringing to mind related ideas.”).
126 E.g., id. at 322 (“The controlled portion of the process involves deliberately generating
retrieval cues that might bring to mind the sought-after memories.”)
127 See generally Delia Dumitrescu & Johan Martinsson, Surveys as a Social Experience:
The Lingering Effects of Survey Design Choices on Respondents’ Survey Experience and
Subsequent Optimizing Behavior, 28 INT’L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 534 (2016).
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Obviously, this social interaction is narrow and constrained.
Nonetheless, most questionnaires are built on the basic framework
of a conversation (i.e., questions and answers) between the
questionnaire’s author and the respondent, so questionnaire
responses are somewhat influenced by the social rules that govern
ordinary conversations.128 Social issues such as self-presentation
and social desirability may influence survey responses. These issues
can be expected to be particularly strong if the survey is
administered by an in-person interviewer, but even selfadministered online questionnaires can have some of these selfpresentation effects. Because the role of survey participant is
voluntary, these informal social rules influence not only the
responses that are offered, but also whether the respondent
participates in the first place and how diligently the respondent
performs the task of answering the survey’s questions.
These two theoretical perspectives combine to suggest a wide
variety of ways in which response effects may come about.129
Consider the following examples of their application to the
Ever-Ready variants.
Different phrasings of a question may create subtle differences
in meaning. Unlike judges who interpret the meaning of statutes
based on specialized legal training and purposeful consideration,130
survey participants may interpret the meaning of questions in a
naturalistic or impressionistic manner based on the denotative or
connotative meanings of words. The subtleties and ambiguities of
language interpretation—ample enough when limited to a single
word for a single individual and becoming more complex and
probabilistic when combinations of words are considered across
many individuals—may cause the Ever-Ready variants to have
different response effects.
128 See id. at 535 (“If respondents perceive surveys as conversations, then breaking any
social conversation rule during the interview should affect the respondent’s behavior down
the line.”).
129 See, e.g., Yfke P. Ongena & Wil Dijkstra, A Model of Cognitive Processes and
Conversational Principles in Survey Interview Interaction, 21 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 145, 154–55 (2007) (providing a model of interviewer-respondent interaction in
survey interviews taking into consideration the effect of conversational principles and
cognitive processes).
130 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 1179, 1226 (1990) (noting that some courts apply maxims of statutory interpretation,
such as, “[g]ive effect if possible to every word of the statute”).
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If respondents view a portion of a question’s wording as awkward
or peculiar, respondents may give more attention to that question
(or that portion of the question). If some Ever-Ready variants are
more unwieldly or unnatural in their wording, they may draw more
attention, potentially yielding differential response effects.
Different phrasings of a question may influence the way in which
respondents make their judgments. In the context of the Ever-Ready
method, respondents forming a judgment as to the junior product’s
source might use information from the stimulus (e.g., the product’s
trade dress), or respondents might use information recalled from
their memory (e.g., the most well-known brands in the product
category). If some Ever-Ready variants prompt participants to rely
more on information from the stimulus and less on information from
memory, differential response effects may occur.
Some question phrasings may engender more cognitive effort
among participants. This might occur if some wordings are more
narrowly focused than others, effectively giving participants a
judgment task that is smaller in scope and easier to accomplish. It
might also occur if some question phrasings give respondents more
motivation to carefully and thoroughly consider the judgment task.
If some Ever-Ready variants require or motivate more cognitive
effort to answer, differential response effects may be brought about.
Under the norms of ordinary social conversation, listeners expect
speakers to include only information in their speech that is relevant
to the ongoing goal of the conversation.131 When people participate
in the quasi-conversation of a questionnaire, the same social norm
could prompt participants to expect that all the information
provided in the questionnaire is relevant to the task at hand. As a
result, there may be minor or incidental features of the
questionnaire that respondents interpret as intentional and,
therefore, relevant to question meaning and survey responses. For
example, if a survey’s open-ended question offers participants a very
large space for writing the narrative response, participants may
interpret the space as a signal that the researcher expects a lengthy
response. In addition to incidental features of the questionnaire,
131 See Michaela Wänke, Conversational Norms and the Interpretation of Vague
Quantifiers, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PHSCY. 301, 303 (2002) (noting that normal
conversation includes “cooperative principles” where both parties understand the information
they should contribute).
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such as the size of the response space, the alternate question
phrasings of the Ever-Ready variants may contain subtle cues that
appear to be neutral but, in fact, offer signals that respondents
interpret as meaningful. In this way, the wording of different
Ever-Ready variants may bring about differing response effects.
Participants who sense no biased or leading verbiage in the
questionnaire may infer the researcher’s intentions are neutral and
objective. These participants may “let down their guard” against
influence from biased question wording. Paradoxically, such
participants may then be especially vulnerable to response effects.
This is not far-removed from the logic already embraced by the law
for witness examination at trial. Whereas leading questions are
acceptable during cross-examination because the witness is
presumed to vigilantly resist the leading influence of the unfriendly
examining attorney,132 leading questions are objectionable during
direct examination because the witness is presumed to be more
willing to follow the leading influence of the friendly attorney.133 In
the survey context, participants who believe the survey is being
conducted by a neutral and objective researcher might have neither
the determined resistance of a hostile witness nor the willing
compliance of a friendly witness. Instead, participants who trust the
unseen survey researcher as a neutral truth-seeker may be
unsuspecting and, therefore, especially susceptible to some
response effects from question wording. In this way, it may be that
the Ever-Ready variants which appear the most neutral to
participants are the variants that yield the strongest response
effects.
This list of potential causes for response effects is far from
comprehensive. The two theoretical perspectives of answering a
survey question⎯as a cognitive process and a social encounter—
combine and interact to yield a wide variety of potential causes for
response effects.

132 WIGMORE, supra note 101, § 773, at 165 (“[N]ot only the presumable bias of the witness
for the opponent’s cause, but also his sense of reluctance to become the instrument of his own
discrediting, deprive him of any inclination to accept the cross-examiner’s suggestions unless
the truth forces him to.”).
133 See supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.
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3. The Legal and Psychometric Perspectives Combined.
Drawing together the discussion of the legal and psychometric
perspectives suggests there are many potential causes for response
effects. Any of these potential causes might apply to a question’s
wording, and these potential influences can accentuate or
counteract one another, yielding a single, cumulative response
effect. Indeed, there are so many potential causes that practically
any survey question can be said to have the potential for response
effects. This is one of the reasons that, as described by Professor
McCarthy, “It is notoriously easy for one survey expert to appear to
tear apart the methodology of a survey taken by another.”134
Potential response effects are so ubiquitous that an experienced
survey researcher should have no difficulty in identifying many of
them for practically any survey question.
This is not to suggest the Ever-Ready variants do indeed have
response effects. Potential response effects, based on speculative
theoretical explanations, are ubiquitous in survey research;
however, actual and sizable response effects are far less common.135
Therefore, the second testable proposition of this Article is that each
of the Ever-Ready variants may have actual and sizable response
effects. Some variants are expected to have response effects that
tend to yield higher estimates, cutting toward the desires of
plaintiffs, while other variants are expected to have response rates
that tend to yield lower estimates, i.e., cutting toward defendants.
Some variants are expected to have response effects that strongly
influence a survey’s final results, while other variants are expected
to have a de minimus effect on results. In other words, the response
effects for Ever-Ready variants are likely to vary in terms of
direction (i.e., effects that favor plaintiffs or defendants) and
magnitude (i.e., effects that are small or large).
Which of the Ever-Ready variants, if any, suffer from
unacceptable response effects? Some courts have expressed
confidence in the ability of fact finders to predict response effects

MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 32.178.
See Sowmya Narayan & Jon A. Krosnick, Education Moderates Some Response Effects
in Attitude Measurement, 60 PUB. OPINION Q. 58, 65 (1996) (“Not all experiments intended to
yield response effects succeed in doing so.”).
134
135
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based on an examination of the question’s wording.136 Other courts
have expressed a fear that response effects are undetectable and,
therefore, an ever-present danger with survey-based evidence.137
Both of those perspectives are incorrect. On one hand, it is
impossible to accurately predict all the response effects of a question
with an armchair, ex ante analysis. There are far too many response
effects potentially at play, and the effects swirl about, perhaps
counteracting or cooperating with one another. Unless the response
effects are egregious and obvious, no one can perform a truly
complete analysis by mere inspection. On the other hand, response
effects can be readily detected by empirical analysis.138 When the
appropriate empirical techniques are dedicated to the task, the
extent and direction of response effects are simple to observe. When
these specialized empirical techniques are applied, many potential
response effects turn out to be false alarms.139
Both these issues are well illustrated by a classic study from the
psychology literature. In this study, Professors Elizabeth Loftus and
John Palmer showed films of traffic accidents to groups of study
participants.140 After watching each film, participants were given a
questionnaire that asked, “About how fast were the cars going when
they <verb> each other?”141 Participants were randomly assigned to

136 See Morales v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., No. 2:14-CV-04387,, 2017 WL 2598556, at *10
(C.D. Cal. June 9, 2017) (“Unlike novel scientific theories, a finder of fact should be able to
determine whether asserted technical deficiencies undermine a survey’s probative value.”
(alterations omitted)); L & F Prods. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 845 F. Supp. 984, 995–96
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[W]e have also become familiar with the subtle ways surveys are structured
. . . . Those who believe they can manipulate the structure of consumer surveys to gain a
tactical advantage in the courtroom may actually harm their client’s strategic position before
the finder of fact.”).
137 E.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Balt. Football Club LP, 34 F.3d 410, 416
(7th Cir. 1994) (commenting, after finding faults in a survey, “no doubt there are other tricks
of the survey researcher’s black arts that we have missed”); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (commenting, regarding expert testimony more broadly,
“[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in
evaluating it”).
138 See Narayan & Krosnick, supra note 135 at 65 (noting several surveys were intended to
induce response effects but did not after an experiment testing for them).
139 See id. (performing a meta-analysis of a series of experiments and noting that multiple
response effects were not significant enough to be considered successful).
140 Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An
Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING &
VERBAL BEHAV. 585, 586 (1974).
141 Id.
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receive one of five different versions of the questionnaire, each using
a different verb: “smashed” (which yielded an average speed
estimate of 41 mph), “collided” (39 mph), “bumped” (38 mph), “hit”
(34 mph), and “contacted” (32 mph).142 This study illustrates the
strength of response effects and the difficulty of detecting them by
ex ante inspection. The stark difference in results between
“smashed” and “contacted” has been cited many times.143 However,
the words “smashed” and “contacted” have flagrantly different
connotations, so this empirical finding is not terribly surprising.144
If a party to litigation had an incentive to demonstrate that
observers had high estimates of a car’s speed, and that party
proffered a survey like the one used in the Loftus/Palmer study with
the verb “smashed,” a judge would be understandably suspicious
based only on her inspection and understanding that “smashed”
slanted the description towards the party’s desired result.
“Smashed” is egregious and therefore obvious. The same could be
said for a party with the opposite desire who used the verb
“contacted” in such a survey. But what about a survey that used the
verbs “hit” or “collided”? Neither of those words have connotations
that are strongly related to speed, and a judge might reasonably
consider either of those words to be acceptable choices for a
questionnaire. However, the findings of Professors Loftus and
Palmer demonstrated that “collided” yielded average speed
estimates approximately 15% higher than “hit.”145 Thus, this classic
study illustrates that response effects can be strong, yet difficult to
detect by mere inspection. The study also illustrates that response
142 See id. (providing a table exhibiting the mean speed estimate for each verb with which
the subjects were interrogated).
143 E.g., Stuart Rabner, Evaluating Eyewitness Identification Evidence in the 21st Century,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (2012) (discussing how, in the Loftus/Palmer study, events were
remembered differently based on the wording of the questions).
144 Compare, Smash, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY (1969) (defining as “to
break into pieces by violence”), with Contact, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY (1969)
(defining as “a touching or a meeting”).
145 Loftus & Palmer, supra note 140 at 586. In terms of statistical significance, Loftus and
Palmer did not perform any comparisons of average responses for any pairs of verbs. Their
only statistical test was an overall analysis of variance, which was significant. The
information that would be needed to perform a pairwise comparison was not published in
their report. As a result, it is unknown whether the difference in mean estimates in response
to “collided” and “hit” was statistically significant. However, given the statistical power that
was employed in the study and the large difference that was observed, a calculation that the
difference is indeed statistically significant would be unsurprising.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss2/5

32

DeRosia: Fixing Ever-Ready: Repairing and Standardizing the Traditional Su

2019]

FIXING EVER-READY

645

effects from question wordings are easily laid bare when specialized
empirical tests are applied to the purpose. Thus, the best technique
is a randomized experiment, i.e., a survey with participants
randomly assigned to receive different versions of the
questionnaire, that directly compares the results generated by the
different question wordings.
Therefore, the plan here is straightforward. In Part V, the second
proposition will be tested with a series of randomized experiments
that will measure the direction and magnitude of any response
effects for the Ever-Ready variants.
IV. VARIANTS OF THE EVER-READY METHOD
A. EXEMPLARS OF THE EVER-READY METHOD AS USED IN FEDERAL
COURTS

This section assesses the extent to which the Ever-Ready method
has, in practice, splintered into a number of variants. Twenty
Ever-Ready surveys conducted by prominent expert witnesses were
reviewed, with a focus on the first Ever-Ready question. The first
item listed in Table 1 is the question as used in the original
Ever-Ready survey. The other items listed in Table 1 are the first
Ever-Ready question as used in more recent surveys. Each of the
twenty exemplars was proffered to a federal court or published in
the academic literature. Each of the question wordings was drawn
from commercial or public sources, most often from expert reports
obtained from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER) system maintained by the U.S. Courts.
The selection procedure for choosing the exemplars in Table 1
can be described as a “purposeful sampling” method.146 To avoid
uninformed or careless question constructions, only experts with
experience in litigation surveys were chosen, and experts with a
Ph.D. or equivalent in marketing or a related field were
emphasized. The exemplars were selected in an effort to include the
work of a variety of the most prominent expert witnesses, typically
including only one example for each expert, and emphasizing more

146 See MICHAEL Q. PATTON, QUALITATIVE EVALUATION AND RESEARCH METHODS 169 (2d
ed. 1990) (“The logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selection information-rich cases
for study in depth.”) (emphasis in original).
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recent usage. None of the exemplars that were used in litigation
were excluded by the courts; in a few cases the admissibility of the
testimony was left unchallenged by the opposing party, but in most
cases the court admitted the testimony after the opponent moved
for exclusion based on the reliability standard of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.147 Considering the judicial commentaries on each
survey—found in rulings on motions to exclude the survey-based
testimony, rulings on motions for summary judgment, or opinions
in bench trials—no courts offered any criticisms of the question
wordings listed in Table 1.148
One conclusion that can be readily drawn from Table 1 is that
experts have worded the first Ever-Ready question in a variety of
ways. The Table is in chronological order, showing that instead of a
consistent pattern of evolution over time, the questions have
departed in a variety of ways from one another and from the original
Ever-Ready survey. This is consistent with this Article’s first
proposition that, in practice, the Ever-Ready method has splintered
into a number of variants.
On initial inspection, all the exemplars seem to have the same
basic denotative meaning. The differences among the exemplars
appear to be subtle. Because none of the question wordings were
criticized by the courts, it appears the courts have either not noticed
the differences in wording or supposed the differences to be
inconsequential.
TABLE 1
EXEMPLARS OF THE EVER-READY METHOD
Researcher(s)

First Ever-Ready Question

Thomas Fitzpatrick

“Who do you think puts out the lamp shown
here?”149

147 FED. R. EVID. 702 (allowing a witness to testify as an expert if, among other things,
his or her specialized knowledge may be reliably applied to the facts of the case).
148 The exception is the district court’s criticism of the original Ever-Ready survey, which
was made prior to the Seventh Circuit’s praise of the survey. See supra notes 36–40 and
accompanying text.
149 Union Carbide Corp., v. Ever-Ready Inc., 392 F. Supp. 280, 292 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev’d
and remanded, 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976); see supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
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Itamar Simonson

“Which company do you think puts out this
brand?”150

Alex Simonson

“What company do you believe puts on
seminars by that name?”151

Hans Zeisel &
David Kaye

“Who do you believe puts out the product
shown on this poster?”152

Ivan Ross

“If you have an opinion, what company or
organization makes or puts out the
particular products you just looked at?” 153

Shari S. Diamond

“What company do you believe puts out the
product whose advertisement you just
saw?”154

Itamar Simonson

“Which company offers the moving assistance
services shown on these trucks?”155

Kenneth Hollander

“If you have an opinion, who do you think puts
out this product?”156

Glenn L. Christensen

“What company do you believe puts out this
product?”157

Gerald L. Ford

“Who do you believe makes or puts out these
shoes?”158

Simonson I, supra note 81, at 188.
Expert Report of Alex Simonson at App. B, 3, Intellechual Equit v. Shillpath Seminars,
No. 1:96-CV-01358, 1996 WL 34393033, Appendix B, at 3 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
152 HANS ZEISEL & DAVID KAYE, PROVE IT WITH FIGURES: EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW AND
LITIGATION 171 (1997).
153 A Study of the Likelihood of Consumer Confusion at 10, Specialty Crops v. Minn. Wild
Hockey Club, No. 0:00-CV-02317, 2001 WL 34828220 (D. Minn. June 18, 2001).
154 Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Lab., 201 F. Supp. 2d 335, 365 (D.N.J. 2002).
155 Expert Report of Itamar Simonson at 7, Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc.,
No. 4:03-CV-01480 (E.D. Mo. June 12, 2006).
156 Expert Report of Kenneth Hollander at 15, Hansen Beverage Co. v. Rockstar, Inc., No.
2:06-CV-00733, 2006 WL 3702326 (D. Nev. Sept. 1, 2006).
157 Expert Report of Glenn L. Christensen at 18, Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla LLC,
No. 2:06-CV-00133, 2007 WL 5813636 (D. Utah Dec. 7, 2007).
158 Declaration and Supplemental Rule 26 Report of Gerald L. Ford at 10, Adidas-America,
Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D. Or. 2008) (No. 3:01-CV-01655).
150
151
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Thomas DuPont

“[W]ho or what company do you think makes
the product I just showed you?”159

Bruce R. Isaacson

“Based on what you saw in the image, who do
you believe makes or produces this DVD?
Please be as specific as possible.”160

Joel H. Steckel

“If you have an opinion, who or what company
do you think puts out this product?”161

Michael B. Mazis

“If you have an opinion, what company do you
think makes or puts out the products shown
in the ad you just read?”162
“What company makes the notebook
computer described in the catalog?”163

Eric D. DeRosia et al.
Robert L. Klein

“Who makes this product?”164

E. Deborah Jay

“What company or companies do you think
printed, released, or put out this book?”165

Dan Sarel

“Who provides the home security system &
service that you saw in the documents you
just reviewed?”166

Ran Kivetz

“Which company makes this product?”167

Hal L. Poret

“What company do you think makes or puts
out the product you just saw?”168

159 Survey to Measure Any Likelihood of Confusion at 7, Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., No. 3:07CV-00168 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2009).
160 Expert Report of Dr. Bruce R. Isaacson at 8, Larry C. Flynt v. Flynt Media Corp., No.
2:09-CV-00048 (C.D. Cal. June 24, 2009).
161 Revised Expert Report of Joel H. Steckel at 12, Hershey Co. v. Promotion in Motion,
Inc., No. 2:07-CV-01601 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2011).
162 Witness Statement of Michael B. Mazis at 4, Bobrick Washroom Equipment, Inc. v.
American Specialties, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-06938 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011).
163 Eric D. DeRosia et al., Sophisticated by Confused: The Impact of Brand Extension and
Motivation on Source Confusion, 28 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 457, 470 (2011).
164 Report of Robert L. Klein at 6, Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., No. 2:08-CV-02632
(E.D. Cal. July 11, 2012).
165 Book Survey Report at App. B, 8 n.4, J.T. Colby & Co., Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 1:11-CV04060 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013).
166 Expert Report of Dr. Dan Sarel at 15, ADT LLC v. Alarm Prot. Tech. Fla., LLC, No.
9:12-CV-80898 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2014).
167 Expert Report of Dr. Ran Kivetz at 24, Reynolds Consumer Prods, Inc. v. Handi-Foil
Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00214 (E.D. Va. Jan. 8, 2014).
168 Expert Report of Hal Poret at 13, Ass Armor, LLC v. Under Armour, Inc., No. 1:15-CV20853 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2016).
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B. GENERALIZED FORM OF THE EVER-READY VARIANTS

Rather than simply treating the twenty exemplars in Table 1 as
twenty different variants of the Ever-Ready method, the exemplars
were input into a structural linguistic analysis to reveal an
underlying, generalized structure. This conceptual analysis relied
on the similarities and dissimilarities of the twenty exemplars to
identify the components of the generalized structure of the
Ever-Ready variants and the elements of each component.169 The
results of the analysis are summarized in Table 2, below.
This generalized structure of the Ever-Ready variants has seven
components, each with its own elements. Three of the components
(source referent, verb, and product referent) were found in all of the
exemplars. The other four components (consideration constraint,
reactivity suppression, allowance for subjectivity, and specificity
request) were found in only some of the exemplars and are,
therefore, optional.
TABLE 2
STRUCTURAL LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
Component
Element
Consideration Constraint

• “Based on what you saw in the
image,”170
• [none]

Reactivity Suppression

• “If you have an opinion,”171
• [none]

Source Referent

• “Who”172
• “What company”173
• “What company or organization”174

169
170
171
172
173
174

See supra Section IV.A.
See, e.g., Isaacson, supra note 160.
See, e.g., Steckel, supra note 161.
See, e.g., Sarel, supra note 166.
See, e.g., DeRosia, supra note 163.
See, e.g., Consumer Confusion, supra note 153.
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• “What company or companies”175
Allowance for Subjectivity

• “do you think”176
• “do you believe”177
• [none]

Verb

• “puts out”178
• “makes”179
• “makes or puts out”180
• “offers”181
• “provides”182

Product Referent

• “this product?”183
• “this brand?”184

Specificity Request

• “Please be as specific as possible
in your answer.”185
• [none]

Based on the components identified by the structural analysis, a
general form of the first Ever-Ready question can be described as
the following:
[consideration constraint] + [reactivity suppression] +
[source referent] + [allowance for subjectivity] + [verb]
+ [product referent] + [specificity request]
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

See, e.g., Book Survey, supra note 165.
See, e.g., Simonson, supra note 150.
See, e.g., Christensen, supra note 157.
See, e.g., Steckel, supra note 161.
See, e.g., Kivetz, supra note 167.
See, e.g., Mazis, supra note 162.
See, e.g., Simonson, supra note 155.
See, e.g., Sarel, supra note 166.
See, e.g., Christensen, supra note 157.
See, e.g., Simonson, supra note 150.
See, e.g., Isaacson, supra note 160.
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With two possible elements of “consideration constraint,” two
possible elements of “reactivity suppression,” and so on, as
described in Table 2, the elements of the structural analysis can be
combined to yield 1440 different versions of the first Ever-Ready
question. For example, the general form can be combined to yield
the following possibilities:
Based on what you saw in the image, if you have an
opinion, what company puts out this product?
If you have an opinion, who do you think offers this
brand? Please be as specific as possible in your answer.
If you have any thoughts about this, what company or
companies do you believe provide this product?
Based on what you saw in the image, who makes this
product?
This general form does not incorporate every aspect of the
exemplars, particularly with respect to the variety of ways
researchers referred to the specific product, e.g., “this book” or “this
DVD”). As a result, the 1440 different combinations do not fully
reproduce all the exemplars. However, some of the exemplars are
reproduced completely, and all of them are reproduced
substantially. This structural linguistic analysis makes possible an
empirical evaluation of the generalized form of Ever-Ready
variants.
V. RESPONSE EFFECTS OF THE EVER-READY VARIANTS
A. STUDY 1

1. Method.
Study 1 provides an initial empirical prediction of the response
effects for the many different components and elements of the
Ever-Ready variants. Study 1 was designed as if it were being
conducted for a trademark infringement dispute. A fictitious junior
mark for peanut butter (Figure 1) was created to serve as a stimulus
in the study. Considering the similarity between the HERSH’S
junior mark and the HERSHEY’S senior mark, the similarity of
their trade dress, and Hershey’s 2013 brand extension into
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chocolate-based bread spreads,186 it seemed reasonable to think that
many consumers would be confused and believe the Hershey
Company is the source of the peanut butter.
Figure 1. Junior Mark Stimulus

Because much of the procedural method used in Study 1 is
similar to the methods used in the other studies reported here,
Study 1 is described in some detail. For the most part, Study 1 was
conducted in a manner similar to typical Ever-Ready surveys
submitted to federal courts.187 A total of 750 survey participants
from the United States were recruited to participate in an online
questionnaire. All the participants were customers in the junior
product category: those who reported they had purchased peanut
butter in the last three months or intended to purchase peanut
butter in the next three months. Participation was further limited
to those who reported they were the primary decision maker in their
household for peanut butter purchases. Among the study’s
participants, 47% were female, the average age was 34.6 years, and
the average income was $52,015 per year.

186 See Monica Watrous, Hershey seeks to set new bar in spreads, FOOD BUSINESS NEWS
(Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/3143-hershey-seeks-to-set-newbar-in-spreads (noting that Hershey released several chocolate spreads).
187 See supra Section IV.B (presenting a generalized structure for the Ever-Ready method).
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After a task orientation,188 the stimulus (Figure 1) was shown in
full color to participants. Then, as described more fully below, the
first Ever-Ready question was asked, and the participant’s openended response was collected.
As is typical with the Ever-Ready method, a follow-up question
was then asked: “What other products (if any) are also put out by
that company (or companies)?” When using the Ever-Ready method,
this open-ended question often provides useful insight into the
participant’s response to the first question. For example,
participants who answered this question with “chocolate kisses”
were clearly thinking of Hershey’s as the source of the product.
The stimulus was kept in the view of participants while they
answered each of the questions.
Given that the purpose of Study 1 was to make an initial
prediction of the response effects that are associated with the
generalized form of the Ever-Ready method, the seven components
in Table 2 were treated as separate experiments. That is, rather
than a combined 2 x 3 x 4 x 3 x 5 x 2 x 2 full-factorial design,189 the
seven components were randomly assigned individually and
analyzed independently. The efficiency of this design relies on the
simplifying assumption that the seven components do not interact
with one another. Ideally, interactions between the components
would have been incorporated into the design and analysis.
However, estimating so many parameters in a stable manner would
have required many thousands of survey participants. Even
considering only two-way interactions with a partial-factorial
design in such a highly dimensional space would have been
prohibitive. Fortunately, the efficient design that was used here is
sufficient to fulfill the purpose of Study 1.
The design of the experiment called for each respondent to be
asked a randomly generated version of the first Ever-Ready
question based on the generalized form summarized in Table 2.190
188 “On the next page, you will see a product that you may or may not have seen before. It
is the type of product you might see in a supermarket or grocery store. Please examine the
product as if you were considering purchasing it. Please take as much or little time examining
the product as you like. To view the product, please press the ‘continue’ button.”
189 See ROGER E. KIRK, EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: PROCEDURES FOR THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES (3d ed. 1996) (“A factorial design is one in which all possible combinations of the
levels of two or more treatments occur together in the design.”).
190 See supra Section IV.B.
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Using this method, a participant could have received any one of the
1440 possible combinations of the elements.191 For example, the first
four consumers who participated in pretests for Study 1 were asked
the four randomly generated versions of the Ever-Ready question
that are listed as examples in the “Generalized Form of the
Ever-Ready Variants.”192
2. Results and Discussion.
The responses of each participant to the two open-ended
questions, i.e., the manipulated Ever-Ready question and unmanipulated follow-up question, were evaluated to determine
whether the participant experienced source confusion. Participants
who answered “Hershey’s” were determined to be suffering source
confusion. In addition, participants who answered the second
question with “chocolate bars” or the like were determined to be
suffering source confusion. In keeping with the methods typically
used by expert witnesses when performing studies submitted as
testimony to federal courts, this coding task was performed by the
researcher. During the coding process, the researcher was blind to
the version of the Ever-Ready question that was displayed to each
participant.
Table 3 shows the confusion rates for each element of the
generalized form of the Ever-Ready question. Some of the elements
have surprisingly large response effects, particularly considering
they are merely minor variations in language, e.g., changing
“makes” to “provides” was associated with a difference of ten
percentage points in consumer confusion. Other elements had only
small response effects, e.g., changing “this brand” to “this product”
was associated with a difference of only two percentage points.
Statistical testing was inapplicable here because the purpose of
Study 1 was to provide an initial prediction for the different
atomistic elements, not a test of any version of the entire question.
Even small effects in the elements of the question might accumulate

191 Minor alterations were made as necessary to some combinations for formatting and
grammatical correctness. For example, in combinations that included “company or
companies” and “provides,” the latter was changed to “provide” for the sake of subject-verb
agreement.
192 See supra Section IV.B at 37.
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to yield a large effect when elements are combined to become a
complete question.
TABLE 3
RESULTS OF STUDY 1
Components and Elements

Proportion
Confused

Consideration Constraint
• “Based on what you saw in the image,”
• [none]

66.0% P
63.4% D

Reactivity Suppression
• “If you have an opinion,”
• “If you have any thoughts about this,”
• [none]

62.5% D
64.8%
66.8% P

Source Referent
• “Who”
• “What company”
• “What company or organization”
• “What company or companies”

65.5%
67.9% P
63.6%
61.3% D

Allowance for Subjectivity
• “do you think”
• “do you believe”
• [none]

69.8% P
63.4%
60.4% D

Verb
•
•
•
•
•

“puts out”
“makes”
“makes or puts out”
“offers”
“provides”

Product Referent
• “this product?”
• “this brand?”
Specificity Request
• “Please be as specific as possible in your
answer.”
• [none]
P
D

65.3%
69.6% P
61.7%
67.2%
59.5% D

63.6% D
65.7% P

65.0% P
64.4% D

The element with the highest confusion, i.e., the most plaintiff-friendly.
The element with the lowest confusion, i.e., the most defendant-friendly.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

43

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 [2019], Art. 5

656

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:613

Within each of the seven components, the element that is most
plaintiff-friendly, i.e., yielding the highest reported confusion, and
the element that is most defendant-friendly, i.e., yielding the lowest
reported confusion, are indicated in Table 3. These elements with
the strongest response effects can be used to predict the versions of
the Ever-Ready question which will have the strongest response
effects. Bringing together the seven elements that yielded the
highest reported consumer confusion, the most plaintiff-friendly
version of the first Ever-Ready question is predicted to be the
following: “Based on what you saw in the image, what company do
you think makes this brand? Please be as specific as possible in your
answer.” In contrast, the version of the Ever-Ready question that is
predicted to be most defendant-friendly, i.e., the version yielding the
lowest reported consumer confusion, is predicted to be the following:
“If you have an opinion, what company or companies provide this
product?”
A logistic regression analysis with the seven component
indicators as independent variables was performed to check the
robustness of the basic findings using control variables. Even with
the addition of several statistical control variables (the participant’s
gender, age, annual income, monthly purchase frequency for peanut
butter, and monthly purchase frequency for candy193), the prediction
of the most plaintiff-friendly and defendant-friendly versions of the
Ever-Ready question remained unchanged.
Overall, the results of Study 1 are broadly consistent with this
Article’s second proposition that seemingly subtle differences in the
wording of the first Ever-Ready question can have a strong influence
on the results obtained using the Ever-Ready method.194
Furthermore, the results of Study 1 predict the magnitude and
relative direction of the elemental response effects, allowing a
prediction of the complete versions of the Ever-Ready question that
will have the strongest response effect toward the interests of
plaintiffs and defendants.
However, Study 1 only predicts such effects. Study 2 is designed
to directly test the effects by comparing the results obtained using
193 With the exception of gender, which was “dummy coded,” all the control variables were
measured quantitatively: age in years, annual income in dollars, and frequency of purchase
in peanut butter and candy in ounces per month.
194 See supra Section III.B.
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the most plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version with those obtained
using the most defendant-friendly Ever-Ready version.
B. STUDY 2

A total of 250 peanut butter buyers participated in Study 2.195
After viewing the product shown in Figure 1, participants were
randomly assigned to receive either the plaintiff-friendly
Ever-Ready version196
or the defendant-friendly Ever-Ready
version.197 The other aspects of the method used in Study 2 were the
same as in Study 1.
Participants’ open-ended responses were coded in the same way
as in Study 1. Among the 125 participants who were asked the most
plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version, 91 participants (72.8%)
experienced source confusion. In contrast, among the 125
participants who were asked the most defendant-friendly
Ever-Ready version, 76 participants (60.8%) experienced source
confusion. This difference between experimental conditions is
statistically significant (X2 = 4.06, p < 0.05).
These findings support the second proposition of this Article that
differences in the Ever-Ready question can strongly influence the
results of a consumer confusion study. The difference in confusion
rates between the two conditions is quite large considering the only
difference involved subtle changes in the wording of the question.
The direction of the observed difference confirms the prediction of
Study 1 concerning which version of the Ever-Ready question would
be more plaintiff friendly and which would be more defendant
friendly.
One limitation of Study 2 is its lack of a control condition. Studies
that are submitted to courts as part of expert testimony typically
include a control condition to rule out alternative explanations for
the study’s results.198 It could be argued that a control condition
Consumers did not participate in more than one of the studies reported here.
The plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version read as follows: “Based on what you saw in
the image, what company do you think makes this brand? Please be as specific as possible in
your answer.”
197 The defendant-friendly Ever-Ready version read as follows: “If you have an opinion,
what company or companies provide this product?”
198 See Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 5, at 2037–38 (“Over time, courts and researchers
have come to recognize that the question in a likelihood-of-confusion survey is a causal one. .
. . As a result, survey design has evolved so that surveys now typically include controls
195
196
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would account for the wording effects observed in Studies 1 and 2.
Another limitation of Study 2 is that it uses the same stimulus as
Study 1, and thus, it is unclear whether the response effects will be
robust to other stimuli. Additionally, it could be argued that because
the open-ended responses in Studies 1 and 2 were coded by the
researcher (as is common in studies that form the basis of expert
witness testimony) rather than multiple independent referees (as is
common in academic research), the findings need verification. Study
3 addresses these limitations.
Furthermore, Studies 1 and 2 are so-called “reading tests” in the
sense that in each study the stimulus was kept in view of the
participants while they answered the Ever-Ready questions.199
Another approach sometimes used in litigation studies is a so-called
“memory test,” in which the stimulus is removed from view while
participants answer the Ever-Ready questions.200 As noted by
commentators, “[c]ourts have approved and disapproved of both
reading tests and memory tests.”201 In light of the disagreement
among courts on this issue, Studies 1 and 2 used a reading test
approach, and Studies 3 and 4 used a memory test approach.
C. STUDY 3

1. Method.
A total of 400 buyers of ready-to-eat breakfast cereal participated
in Study 3. The method was the same as Study 2 except as outlined
below.
Federal courts have recognized the ability of an experimental
control group to “rule out alternative explanations for the survey
participants’ answers.”202 If a survey using the Ever-Ready method
designed to rule out competing explanations for consumer responses other than confusion
caused by the allegedly infringing mark.”).
199 See POM Wonderful LLC v. Organic Juice USA, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 188, 200 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (“A reading test allows respondents to view the stimulus (in this case, the
advertisement) while they answer questions relating to it.”).
200 See id. (“In contrast [to a reading test], a memory test asks respondents to first view the
stimulus, and then answer questions based on what they remember seeing.”).
201 See Henry D. Ostberg, Response to the Article Entitled, “A ‘Reading’ Test or a ‘Memory’
Test: Which Survey Methodology is Correct?,” 95 TRADEMARK REP. 1446, 1446–47 nn.4–5
(2005) (citing many cases in which courts approved and disapproved of both reading and
memory tests).
202 Rice v. Brand Imps., LLC, No. 1:09-CV-03254, 2011 WL 13214072, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar.
4, 2011).
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shows a high percentage of customers were confused by the junior
product, there may be a very potent counter-explanation that must
be addressed: consumers might have inferred the senior user is the
product’s source for reasons that have nothing to do with trademark
infringement. For example, such inferences can be expected if
consumers believe the senior user already offers many other
products in the category. In such a situation, consumers could be
confused by practically any new product, even one that is not
infringing. In trademark litigation surveys,203 a control condition
with a stimulus that removes the allegedly infringing aspect of the
junior mark from the product, while leaving the rest of the product
unchanged, can be used to rule out such inferences as an alternate
explanation for the survey’s results.204
Study 3 followed this approach by adding a control condition.
Therefore, Study 3 was a 2 (plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version vs.
defendant-friendly Ever-Ready version) x 2 (junior mark vs. control)
full-factorial experiment.205 Each participant was randomly
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions.
Study 3 used a different junior mark as a stimulus: a fictitious
POPPING TARTZ ready-to-eat cereal (Figure 2a). Considering the
similarity of the junior mark to the POP-TARTS senior mark, the
imitation of the senior’s visual trade dress in the junior’s package,
and the 1994 brand extension by the Kellogg Company of POPTARTS into ready-to-eat cereals,206 it seemed reasonable to think
that many consumers would be confused and believe the Kellogg
Company is the source of the product in Figure 2a.
To reflect a fictitious scenario that the Kellogg Company claims
the POPPING TARTZ word mark is infringing of POP TARTS but
does not make a similar claim for the trade dress, a control stimulus
203 Courts typically refer to any empirical research involving self-report questionnaires as
a “survey,” even if it is an experiment with randomly assigned conditions. See, e.g., POM
Wonderful LLC, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (“[Defendant’s expert] conducted a total of three
surveys . . . . Each respondent was randomly assigned to a ‘test’ group or a ‘control’ group.”).
204 See Diamond, supra note 121, at 399 (“In designing a survey-experiment, the expert
should select a stimulus for the control group that shares as many characteristics with the
experimental stimulus as possible, with the key exception of the characteristic whose
influence is being assessed.”).
205 See Kirk, supra note 189.
206 See Lucia Peters, Whatever Happened To Pop-Tarts Crunch Cereal? A Brief History of
the Lost Breakfast Treat, BUSTLE (June 25, 2015), https://www.bustle.com/articles/92635whatever-happened-to-pop-tarts-crunch-cereal-a-brief-history-of-the-lost-breakfast-treat.
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was created (Figure 2b). By creating a control that alters the word
mark to something non-infringing (TOP SMARTZ) and leaves
everything else unchanged, the control condition isolates the
POPPING TARTZ mark and tests whether it causes consumers to
be confused. The Kellogg Company is a leader in ready-to-eat
cereals,207 and that product category has many products offered by
only a handful of competitors, so many consumers might infer the
Kellogg Company is the source of practically any new cereal
product. Therefore, an experimental control is especially important
here for determining what incremental portion of confusion is
caused by the allegedly infringing word mark.
Study 3 was a memory test208 in the sense that the stimulus was
removed before participants answered the Ever-Ready questions.
In Study 3, the coding procedure was based on the judgments of
three independent coding referees who were blind to the study’s
purpose and the assigned experimental conditions. The three
referees underwent a video training procedure that taught the
principles of coding for source confusion, including many examples
that were anticipated for this study. The training taught the
referees to evaluate the open-ended responses and determine
whether the participant believed the Kellogg Company was the
source of the product.

207 See Robin G. Thomas et al., Recent trends in ready-to-eat breakfast cereals in the U.S.,
PROCEDIA FOOD SCI. (Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.ars.usda.gov/ARSUserFiles/80400525/
Articles/ProcediaFS2_20-26.pdf (noting that Kellogg is the market leader representing 33%
of ready-to-eat cereal sales).
208 See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
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Figure 2b. Control Stimulus

2. Results and Discussion.
Two of the referees coded the responses independently, and they
agreed on coding for 97.3% of participants. The disagreements were
resolved by appeals to the third referee.
The first planned contrast was a replication of the analysis of
Study 2. When limiting consideration only to the participants who
viewed the junior mark (Figure 2a), the rate of confusion was 84%
among participants who were asked the plaintiff-friendly
Ever-Ready version,209 whereas it was 68% among participants who
were asked the defendant-friendly Ever-Ready version.210 This
difference is statistically significant (X2 = 7.02, p < .01). This directly
replicates the findings of Study 2 using a different stimulus,

209 The plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version read as follows: “Based on what you saw in
the image, what company do you think makes this brand? Please be as specific as possible in
your answer.”
210 The defendant-friendly Ever-Ready version read as follows: “If you have an opinion,
what company or companies provide this product?”
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different coding procedure, and a memory test rather than a reading
test.
Next, the study’s so-called “net confusion” was calculated.
Professor Jacoby describes this calculation for litigation surveys:
“The most important percentage in a likelihood of confusion survey
is . . . the net confusion that remains after subtracting the percent
of confusion obtained with the control from the percent of confusion
found with the experimental (test) stimulus.”211 Net confusion is the
approach the courts typically use to identify the portion of observed
consumer confusion that is due to the allegedly infringing nature of
the junior mark as isolated and distinguished from the baseline
confusion of the control stimulus.212 Courts have developed
thresholds for the level of net confusion that indicates the junior
mark is infringing the senior mark. One court described the
tradition this way: “[W]here there is other evidence weighing in
favor of a likelihood of confusion, courts have held that findings of
15% to 20% confusion corroborate that likelihood.”213
In Study 3, the rate of confusion for the control condition was
60% for the plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version.214 When
compared to the 84% confusion among participants who saw the
junior mark, this yields a net confusion of 24 percentage points, (i.e.,
84%–60%). For the defendant-friendly Ever-Ready version, 58% of
the participants in the control condition were confused. When
compared to 68% confusion among those who saw the junior mark,
this yields a net confusion of 10 percentage points, (i.e., 68%–58%).
In summary, the net confusion for the plaintiff-friendly version was

JACOBY, supra note 97, at 891 (emphasis in original).
See Valador, Inc. v. HTC Corp., 242 F. Supp. 3d 448, 463 (E.D. Va. 2017) (noting that a
properly constructed survey will discount for confusion arising from the control, and thereby
“measure net confusion”).
213 Fiji Water Co. v. Fiji Mineral Water USA, LLC, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1179 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (quoting 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 32:188 (4th ed. 2010);
see also Malaco Leaf, AB v. Promotion In Motion, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 355, 374–75 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (noting that a survey’s confusion figures below 20% are “problematic,” unless
accompanied by other evidence of confusion and that responses below 10% “can become
evidence which will indicate that confusion is not likely” (quoting 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 32:189 (4th ed. 2003)). For a review of the blurry nature of this
traditional standard for net confusion, see MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 32:188.
214 The high level of confusion for the control condition is consistent with the ex ante
expectation that because Kellogg’s is a leading firm in a product category with very few large
competitors, confusion would be high for practically any new product.
211
212
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24 percentage points, whereas it was only 10 percentage points for
the defendant-friendly version.
Therefore, Study 3 shows the proposed effect is observed even
when an experimental control is included in the study: the plaintifffriendly version of the Ever-Ready question yielded greater net
confusion than the defendant-friendly version. Furthermore, Study
3 shows the proposed effect is robust to a change in the stimulus, a
change in coding procedure from coding by the researcher to coding
by blind judges, and a change in the stimulus display procedure
from a reading test to a memory test.
It could be argued that the junior mark stimulus used in Study 3
is similar to the one used in Studies 1 and 2 in the sense that both
junior marks are highly confusing, as evidenced by all the observed
confusion rates far above 50%. The fictitious junior marks were
designed to be highly similar to the senior marks, and this high
similarity might accentuate the differences observed between the
plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version and the defendant-friendly
Ever-Ready version. Study 4 tests this possibility.
Furthermore, it could be argued that the increased confusion
observed when using the plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version is
due to an increase in guessing among participants. As Professor
Simonson points out, people who respond to the Ever-Ready
questions “may provide guesses that are associated with low
confidence.”215 Courts frequently criticize survey results that are
likely to be due to mere “guessing.”216 To directly test this
possibility, Study 4 includes measures of response confidence.
D. STUDY 4

1. Method.
A total of 400 buyers of salty snacks participated in Study 4,
which involved a 2 (plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version vs.
defendant-friendly Ever-Ready version) x 2 (junior mark vs. control)
full-factorial experiment.

Simonson I, supra note 81, at 183.
See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. Positec USA Inc., No. 11-CV-5426, 2015 WL 5612340,
at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2015) (“[R]eliable surveys address the problem of respondents
guessing.” (internal citations omitted)); see also supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text.
215
216
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For Study 4, a new junior mark stimulus (Figure 3a) was created.
The word portion (O’REO) of this fictitious junior mark is similar to
Nabisco’s OREO senior mark. However, the junior product’s trade
dress is dissimilar from the senior product. The junior product
package was designed with green as the dominant color to
potentially evoke Ireland, thereby making an interpretation that
the O’REO mark is Irish more plausible. While the junior marks
used in Studies 1–3 were highly similar to their respective senior
marks, the junior mark used in Study 4 was only moderately similar
to its senior mark. As a result, overall levels of confusion for Study
4 were expected to be lower than in Studies 1–3.
The control stimulus (Figure 3b) was the same as the junior mark
except for the scrambled letters, i.e. O’REO became O’EOR.
Therefore, this control isolates the potentially infringing aspect of
the junior mark–the word mark itself–while keeping the rest of the
product package the same.
Figure 3a. Junior Mark Stimulus
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Study 4 was a “memory test” in the sense that the stimulus was
shown to participants and then removed while the participants
completed the rest of the study. 217
As in Studies 2 and 3, participants were randomly assigned to
receive either the plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version218 or the
defendant-friendly Ever-Ready version.219 Then, questions were
administered that measured each participant’s confidence in his or
her response to the first Ever-Ready question. For this measure,
participants were again shown the first Ever-Ready question and
their answer, and they were asked two questions with seven-point
response scales: “How confident are you in your answer?” (1 = “Not
at all confident,” 7 = “Very confident”), and “How certain are you in
your answer?” (1 = “Not at all certain,” 7 = “Very certain”). These
two measurement items were based on the single measurement
item for indicating response confidence used by Professor Simonson
in conjunction with the Ever-Ready method.220
2. Results and Discussion.
Participants’ answers were blindly coded using the same method
as in Studies 1 and 2, yielding a judgment of whether each
participant reported Nabisco to be the source of the junior mark.
An analysis limited to those who viewed the junior mark (Figure
3a) shows significantly (X2 = 8.4, p < .01) more confusion among
participants who were asked the plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready
version (49%) than among participants who were asked the
defendant-friendly Ever-Ready version (29%). This follows the same
pattern observed in the three previous studies.
A net confusion analysis also shows higher confusion for the
plaintiff-friendly version than for the defendant-friendly version.
The 49% confusion among those who were asked the plaintifffriendly version can be compared to 3% confusion among those who
viewed the control mark. In contrast, the 29% confusion among
See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
The plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version read as follows: “Based on what you saw in
the image, what company do you think makes this brand? Please be as specific as possible in
your answer.”
219 The defendant-friendly Ever-Ready version read as follows: “If you have an opinion,
what company or companies provide this product?”
220 See Simonson I, supra note 81, at 188 (“This task was designed to assess whether indeed
many respondents provide answers even though they were not confident . . .”).
217
218
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those who were asked the defendant-friendly version can be
compared to 1% confusion among those who viewed the control
mark. Therefore, net confusion was 46 percentage points, i.e., 49%–
3%, using the plaintiff-friendly version, and 28 percentage points,
i.e., 29%–1%, using the defendant-friendly version. In summary,
this finding, which is broadly consistent with the finding of Study 3,
demonstrates that using the plaintiff-friendly version yields a net
confusion that is 18 percentage points higher than when using the
defendant-friendly version.
The confidence measure tested the possibility that the plaintifffriendly version has its effect by encouraging more guessing and
low-quality responses among participants. The “confident” and
“certain” measures were highly correlated with one another
(r = .89), so they were treated as a two-item scale and averaged
together. Overall, the confidence reported by participants who were
asked the plaintiff-friendly question (Mean = 4.38) was not
significantly different (t = 0.98, p > .10) from the confidence level
reported by those who were asked the defendant-friendly question
(Mean = 4.12). When the analysis was limited to only those who had
been coded as confused, i.e., those who reported they believed
Nabisco was the source of the junior product, the result was similar:
the difference in confidence among those in the plaintiff-friendly
condition (Mean = 4.53) and confidence among those in the
defendant-friendly condition (Mean = 4.26) was not statistically
significant (t = 0.68, p > .10). These findings suggest the plaintifffriendly question does not encourage any more guesses or lowquality responses than the defendant-friendly version.
VII. THE “KNOWN-CONSERVATIVE” APPROACH
A. DEFINING THE KNOWN-CONSERVATIVE APPROACH

Collectively, the results of these four empirical studies
demonstrate that seemingly subtle differences in the first
Ever-Ready question can consistently and predictably influence the
results of a consumer confusion survey. The most plaintiff-friendly
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version of the Ever-Ready question221 and the most defendantfriendly version of the Ever-Ready question222 may at first appear to
be only subtly different. Indeed, because these two variants are
composed of the elements that make up the various Ever-Ready
questions used by the prominent expert witnesses in Table 1,
neither would appear out of place if submitted to a federal court as
survey evidence in a trademark dispute. However, the four studies
reported in this Article demonstrate the plaintiff-friendly version
consistently yields much higher estimates of consumer confusion
than the defendant-friendly version.223
The magnitude of the differences in response effects from the
different versions of the Ever-Ready question is surprisingly large.
A traditional threshold has developed among the federal courts in
which a survey that finds a net confusion of approximately 15% –
20% demonstrates sufficient consumer confusion to support a
judicial decision that the junior mark infringes upon the senior
mark.224 Using different versions of the Ever-Ready question altered
the net confusion result by 14 percentage points (Study 3)225 and 18
percentage points (Study 4)226, showing very large response effects
in this substantive domain. Indeed, Study 3 found that using the
plaintiff-friendly question put the net confusion result far above the
traditional threshold (24%), whereas using the defendant-friendly
question put it far below the threshold (10%).227 This suggests the
wording of the Ever-Ready question can make a dispositive
difference in a trademark dispute.
The difference in results between the plaintiff-friendly and the
defendant-friendly Ever-Ready versions was found to be consistent
and robust across a variety of methodological factors. The effect was
observed with three different junior marks, including junior marks
that were highly similar to their respective senior marks (Studies 1,

221 The plaintiff-friendly Ever-Ready version reads as follows: “Based on what you saw in
the image, what company do you think makes this brand? Please be as specific as possible in
your answer.”
222 The defendant-friendly Ever-Ready version read as follows: “If you have an opinion,
what company or companies provide this product?”
223 See supra Section VI.
224 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
225 See supra Section VI.C.
226 See supra Section VI.D.
227 See supra Section VI.C.
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2, and 3)228 and a junior mark that was only moderately similar to
its senior mark (Study 4).229 The effect was observed with so-called
reading tests (Studies 1 and 2)230 and memory tests (Studies 3 and
4).231 The effect was observed with blind coding conducted by the
researcher (Studies 1, 2, and 4)232 and blind coding conducted by
independent referees (Study 3).233 The effect was observed when
directly comparing the confusion rates for the plaintiff-friendly
version and the defendant-friendly version (all four studies), and
the effect was observed when a control condition was included to
examine the courts’ preferred metric of net confusion (Studies 3 and
4).234
These empirical results lead to an inevitable question: Which
version of the Ever-Ready question should litigants use? Intuitively,
it might seem that litigants should use a middle-of-the-road version
of the Ever-Ready question. Such intuition, however, is misleading.
The various exemplars of the Ever-Ready question reviewed in
Table 1 were derived from one seminal source (the original
Ever-Ready case), and they appear to have developed clusters of
similar questions, with an evolution based on some unknown
combination of imitating other usage, personal preference, criticism
from opponents, and other factors. With origins so haphazard, there
is no reason to expect that a question wording that balances
between all the plaintiff-friendly and defendant-friendly wordings
would constitute a “correct” representation of confusion. Relatedly,
there is no reason to expect the generalized form of Ever-Ready
variants described supra in Section IV.B contain an equal number
of defendant-friendly and plaintiff-friendly wordings. Therefore, the
mid-point of those 1440 Ever-Ready variants cannot be a proxy for
“neutral truth.”235 Using the language of the classical test theory of

See supra Section VI.A, B, & C.
See supra Section VI.D.
230 See supra Section VI.A, B.
231 See supra Section VI.C, D.
232 See supra Section VI.A, B, D.
233 See supra Section VI.C.
234 See supra Section VI.C, D.
235 Notably, the exemplars listed in Table 1 were more likely to be proffered on behalf of
plaintiffs than defendants. This is consistent with studies of court opinions described supra
in note 11 and accompanying text. Furthermore, one cannot simply assume that question
wordings will bias responses only in the direction implied by the expert’s party-driven
228
229
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psychometrics, there is no reason to expect the different Ever-Ready
variants are parallel measurement items with random, independent
errors.236 Accordingly, there is no reason to expect the errors of the
variants would offset one another. This suggests a middle-ground
formulation of the Ever-Ready question would not yield an unbiased
measure of a latent “true score” of consumer confusion. Instead,
such a formulation would have only the illusory sheen of neutral
truth.
Fortunately, in the adversarial litigation context, a better
solution exists. Instead of using a “middle ground” method, this
Article proposes that parties should use the “known-conservative”
method. Surveys conducted for plaintiffs who wish to demonstrate
that confusion is commonplace among consumers should use the
most defendant-friendly wording: “If you have an opinion, what
company or companies provide this product?” Conversely, surveys
submitted as evidence by defendants who wish to demonstrate that
consumer confusion is rare should use the most plaintiff-friendly
wording: “Based on what you saw in the image, what company do
you think makes this brand? Please be as specific as possible in your
answer.”
These Ever-Ready versions are “conservative” in the sense that
they cut against the party’s directly desired outcome. That is, in
contrast to experts who “have designed and constructed the survey
to provide evidence supporting [their] side of the issue in
controversy,”237 yielding “surveys that are merely transparent paths
to a desired but artificial result,”238 it would be far better for experts
to adopt the survey wording that is least self-serving. In this way,
the survey will demonstrate that a level of confusion exists despite
using a conservative estimation method. As described in the next
section, this conservative approach provides a variety of benefits.
These Ever-Ready versions are “known” in two senses. First, they
are “known” to be conservative based on empirical verification, not
incentives if for no other reason than the experts may not have known how the question
wording would influence survey responses.
236 See Melvin R. Novick, The Axioms and Principle Results of Classical Test Theory, 3 J.
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (1966) (“By classical test theory we shall mean that theory
which postulates the existence of a true score, that error scores are uncorrelated with each
other and with true scores and that observed, true and error scores are linearly related.”).
237 Diamond, supra note 121, at 373 (emphasis added).
238 Simon Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1052 (S.D. Ind. 2000).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

57

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 [2019], Art. 5

670

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:613

merely theory-based reasoning. As reviewed in Section III.B.3, there
are a wide variety of potential causes for response effects. Without
the hurdle of empirical testing, a skilled expert could claim that
practically any question wording is conservative and justify that
claim with seemingly impressive theory-based speculations. With
the hurdle of empirical testing, however, only actual and sizable
response effects can be brought to bear in defining “conservative.”
Second, their conservative status is “known” in the sense that these
empirical findings are published in the scholarly literature, making
them available to all experts, parties, and courts. That is, unlike
methodological research that might be secretly conducted by an
unethical survey expert to find response effects that can “stack the
deck” to create a proprietary competitive advantage, the empirical
results reported here are made fully known to all interested parties.
B. BENEFITS OF A KNOWN-CONSERVATIVE APPROACH

Broadly speaking, the known-conservative method proposed here
reduces uncertainty in the litigation context by improving the
ability of all involved (experts, survey proponents, survey
opponents, and the courts) to consistently and rigorously evaluate
the reliability of an Ever-Ready survey. As described by Professors
Diamond and Franklyn, “[t]he value of surveys to litigants and
courts, both now and in the future, depends on providing clearer
standards for good survey design and educating judges to appreciate
those standards and to evaluate the extent to which a survey
measures up to those standards.”239 This Article advances each of
those boundaries.
For survey experts, the known-conservative method offers muchneeded guidance. Experts have expressed considerable difficulty in
trying to design surveys that are consistently acceptable to the
courts,240 and experts are likely to welcome empirical definitions of
the best practices. The guidance provided by the knownconservative method is especially important because parties may
get only one chance to proffer a survey. If a court criticizes a survey’s
Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 5, at 2066.
See Bruce Isaacson, Review of Trademark and Deceptive Advertising Surveys: Law,
Science, and Design, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 989, 991 (2013) (“[T]he standards by which
surveys are evaluated can seem difficult, inconsistent, puzzling, and even vague, depending
on the matter.”).
239
240
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method, the party is usually unable to proffer a new survey that
demonstrates the survey’s findings are robust to the court’s
concerns. In short, the survey’s design must be “right” the first time.
Based on the guidance of the known-conservative method, experts
will have a much more consistent target to hit.
For parties who proffer surveys, the known-conservative method
will make their surveys more persuasive in four ways. First, a
survey with findings that support the party’s case despite the
methodological headwind created by the known-conservative
method offers a strong test of the party’s proposition, which in turn
suggests the survey evidence is substantial and robust. That is, a
survey that easily overcomes the handicap of known-conservative
methods suggests the marketplace conditions unequivocally match
the party’s theory of the case.241 Second, the proffering party’s
credibility is increased when they demonstrate good faith by
choosing a method that is fair to the opposing party,242 and the
known-conservative method is the method that is most fair to the
opposing party. Third, empirical derivations of known-conservative
methods published in the scholarly literature such as this Article
give parties who use the known-conservative method a clear and
straightforward path to meeting their burden of proving their
survey was conducted in a reliable manner. Fourth, by using a
known-conservative method, the party preempts some of the
criticisms about methodology that an opponent could raise. It can
be presumed that any related modifications of the method that are
advocated by an opponent would improve the results for the
proffering party, so any such complaints from the opponent are
rendered ineffective. As such, using the known-conservative method
fulfills the practical advice given by Justice Antonin Scalia and
241 This is an ancient idea. In 1560, Thomas Wilson described a variety of rhetorical figures
for amplifying or inflating a matter among listeners, including the following: “Sometimes we
amplify by comparing and take our ground upon the weakest and least, the which if they
seem great, then must that needs appear great which we would amplify and increase.”
THOMAS WILSON, THE ART OF RHETORIC 154 (Peter Medine, ed., 1560).
242 This too is an ancient idea. In the early first century BC, the unknown author of
Rhetorica ad Herennium described a variety of rhetorical figures that lend the speaker ethos
(credibility), including the following: “Understatement occurs when we say that by nature,
fortune, or diligence, we or our clients possess some exceptional advantage, and, in order to
avoid the impression of arrogant display, we moderate and soften the statement of it.”
CICERO, AD C. HERNNIUM, DE RATIONE DICENDI (RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM) 355 (E.H.
Warmington ed., 1968).
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Professor Bryan Garner: “Select the most easily defensible position
that favors your client.”243
For parties who oppose surveys, the known-conservative
approach allows for a clear assessment of survey methodology.
Surveys that were not conducted in accordance with knownconservative methods will be susceptible to challenge as being
biased and slanted. In some cases, opponents will be able to use the
results reported here to make a quantitative estimate of the extent
to which a survey’s results were biased toward the desired outcome.
In other cases, such a quantitative estimate will be impossible,
leaving the opponent to point out that the proffering party elected
not to use the best-practice survey methodology published in the
legal literature. This is not a new idea; examining empirical
methods for potential bias is a mainstay of publications in the
practitioner literature about cross-examining expert witnesses.244
However, armed with the empirical definition of best-practice
survey methods, survey opponents can pursue this line of attack
without relying solely on nebulous and speculative (and therefore
likely ineffective) ex ante evaluations of methods such as those
described in Section III.B supra.
Because surveys play an important role in pretrial settlement
negotiations in trademark infringement disputes,245 both survey
proponents and opponents will benefit from reduced uncertainty
about the extent to which a survey’s methods would be acceptable
to the courts. Economic models of pretrial negotiations suggest that
such a reduction in uncertainty about trial outcomes will increase
the likelihood of settlement,246 perhaps to full settlement or at least

243 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING
JUDGES 19 (2008).
244 See, e.g., Edward H. Pappas, Trial Practice: Cross-Examining Expert Witnesses,
92 MICH. B. J. 48, 48 (2013) (“Industry or professional standards . . . provide a basis to
compare an expert’s . . . methodologies with accepted . . . methodologies.”).
245 See Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 5, at 2061 (“Our results indicate that surveys are
used heavily in pretrial assessments and strategic decision making. They play key roles in
claim evaluation and are understood by attorneys as an influential settlement tool for both
sides.”).
246 See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 286 (1973)
(“We have established that if the costs of making an agreement out of court are not excessive,
parties agreeing on the probability of the outcome will make an out-of-court settlement.”);
William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: Some
Preliminary Results, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 753 (2004) (“[I]f the legal rules are clear and the
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partial settlement,247 thereby yielding incremental efficiencies for
parties and the legal system.
The courts–as both gatekeepers and fact-finders–may be the
greatest beneficiaries of the known-conservative approach.
Eliminating methodological artifacts that slant toward the party’s
desired outcome will increase evidentiary reliability and, therefore,
promote good results. In addition, rather than evaluating a survey
method using ex ante theoretical considerations such as those
described in Section III.B supra, a courts’ evaluations of survey
methods will be more effective and more efficient. The courts’
evaluations will be more effective because, unlike ex ante theoretical
evaluations that are inherently uncertain and thus applied
inconsistently, the known-conservative method is empirically
defined, yielding rigorous and consistent evaluations. The courts’
evaluations will be more efficient because evaluating the extent to
which a proffered survey followed the known-conservative method
should be a simple and straightforward matter. Furthermore, by
empirically settling some of the fundamental questions of survey
methodology, the known-conservative approach mollifies the
famously undesirable “battle of the experts” during trial,248 at least
to the extent that the area of terrain that must be contested is
reduced. Judges commonly complain that expert testimony

parties agree on the relevant precedents and facts, [the parties’ estimates of probability of
winning at trial] are not likely to differ significantly, so a settlement will result.”).
247 See J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement,
91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 59 (2016) (“[I]n reality virtually every dispute is ‘partially’ settled. The
same forces that often lead parties to fully settle – joint value maximization, cost
minimization, and risk reduction – will under certain conditions lead them to enter into many
other forms of Pareto-improving agreements.”).
248 Courts bemoan when disputes “devolve into a battle of the experts,” Missouri v.
McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 181 n.2 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting), saying trials can become
“enmeshed” McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C.
2004) in an “exhausting,” Debruce v. Commissioner, Ala. Dept. of Corr., 758 F.3d 1263, 1300
(11th Cir. 2014), “difficult,” Rodriguez v. Olin Corp., 780 F.2d 491, 497 (5th Cir. 1986),
“confusing,” U.S. v. Wecht, No. 06-CR-0026, 2007 WL 2702350, at *18 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13,
2007), and “esoteric exercise,” In re Elec. Carbon Prods. Antitrust Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 389,
401 (D.N.J. 2006), of “dueling experts nitpicking at each other,” Magna Elecs., Inc. v. TRW
Auto. Holdings Corp., No. 1:12-CV-654, 2016 WL 4239181, at *5 n.5 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29,
2016), with results that are “frequently unedifying,” Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Baltimore Football Club LP, 34 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1994), and generate “more heat than
light,” B & S Equip. Co. v. Truckla Servs., Inc., No. 09–3862, 2011 WL 2971901, at *4 n.9
(E.D. La. July 21, 2011).
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consumes too much court time,249 so greater ease and efficiency will
be a true benefit to the courts.
This demonstration of the known-conservative method is
expected to facilitate a new cooperative interaction among
independent scholars who have interests in the methodology of
litigation surveys. Consistent with the viewpoint of Judge Jack
Weinstein that “improvement in expert testimony depends upon
steps the scientific community . . . can take,”250 no single researcher
can (or should) be entitled to identify in entirety the knownconservative versions of the Ever-Ready method. Instead, any
researchers in the scholarly community can use the methods
demonstrated herein to cooperatively identify the knownconservative versions of the Ever-Ready method. The approach
demonstrated in this Article is built to accommodate just such a
collective effort. If, for example, future empirical research finds that
different versions of the introductory instructions251 are plaintifffriendly and defendant-friendly, those instructions can be readily
combined with the known-conservative question wording
demonstrated herein to yield a “new and improved” knownconservative version. In this way, the known-conservative version
of the Ever-Ready method will be collectively defined by the
scholarly literature. Beyond Ever-Ready, the basic concept of a
known-conservative empirical method can be applied to consumer
surveys in other areas of litigation such as secondary meaning,
genericness, and false advertising.252 A cooperative effort among
individual researchers to collectively refine and improve the knownconservative survey methods in the scholarly literature can be
analogously compared to the “open source” movement that has

249 See Zuspann v. Brown, 864 F. Supp. 17, 22 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that expert battles
are “time-consuming”); U.S. v. Sayavongsa, No. H-07-338-2, 2008 WL 2325622, at *5 (S.D.
Tex. June 3, 2008) (saying that expert battles “waste the already scarce and overburdened
resources of the courts”).
250 Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not be
Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 631 (1991).
251 See supra note 188.
252 See Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Surveys are . . .
routinely admitted in trademark and false advertising cases to show actual confusion,
genericness of a name or secondary meaning, all of which depend on establishing that certain
associations have been drawn in the public mind.”).
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cooperatively created many impressive achievements in technology
such as Wikipedia and the Linux operating system.253
C. OBJECTIONS TO A KNOWN-CONSERVATIVE APPROACH

It might be protested that defining the known-conservative
method based on the conclusion the proponent desires to reach is
fundamentally inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction in
Daubert to the trial court evaluating the reliability of scientific
testimony: “The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.”254 However,
such a protest would be misguided. The known-conservative
approach is fully consistent with Daubert’s directive because
applying the known-conservative approach does not involve an
examination of the survey’s conclusions. The approach considers
only (1) the survey’s method and the empirically identified biases
that are brought about by that method, and (2) the incentives of the
party that proffered the survey. Daubert specifically calls on trial
courts to consider whether the “methodology is scientifically
valid.”255 In doing so, courts have commonly criticized question
wordings they expect yield party-friendly methodological biases.256
The known-conservative approach described here applies that same
basic approach of considering party-friendly methodological biases,
except the known-conservative approach does so based on a
systematic empirical analysis.
Courts might be reluctant to consider the empirical results
reported here, and therefore the empirical definitions of the knownconservative wordings, due to the instructions of the Supreme Court
in Ramdass v. Angelone: “Mere citation of a law review to a court
does not suffice to introduce into evidence the truth of the hearsay
or the so-called scientific conclusions contained within it.”257
However, in Ramdass, the court was refusing to consider the results
of a survey reported in a law review which purported to measure
253 See History of the OSI, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, https://opensource.org/history (last
revised October 2018) (referring to software development based on the sharing and
collaborative improvement of software source code).
254 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
255 Id. at 579.
256 See, e.g., supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
257 Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 173 (2000).
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public opinion concerning the issue at controversy in the case.258 The
Court described the survey as so flawed that it “likely would have
been demonstrated to be inadmissible.”259 Judicial consideration of
the results reported in the instant Article would not run afoul of
Ramdass because the studies reported herein do not purport to be
scientific conclusions regarding the data and evidence for any
particular case. Rather, the studies reported here examine the
underlying methodology used by expert witnesses to generate data
and evidence. In the words of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the
methodological inquiry reported here helps courts identify the
“methods”260 that are “reliable,”261 leaving the identification of casedependent “data”262 to the survey experts in various trademark
disputes. In keeping with Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18), courts
are free to take judicial notice of the results reported in this
Article.263
It might also be protested that the known-conservative method
cannot apply in all circumstances. There is some truth to this, in the
sense that it may be necessary for experts to slightly adapt the
wording to accommodate the specific nature of a dispute. For
example, the word “product” in the defendant-friendly version will
need to be adapted when the allegedly infringing junior user offers
a service rather than a product. However, the known-conservative
question wordings are generalized, not tied to any specific case or
situation, so adaptations will be rarely necessary.
VIII.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO BROADER DISCUSSIONS AND
CONCLUSION

In closing, this Article identifies the contributions of these
empirical results to debates about trademark infringement and
scientific evidence in the courtroom.
258 See id. (discussing a public opinion poll concerning whether potential jurors would be
more likely to give a life sentence instead of death if they knew the defendant had to serve at
least 25 years in prison before being parole eligible).
259 Id.
260 FED. R. EVID. 702(c).
261 Id.
262 FED. R. EVID. 702(b).
263 See FED. R. EVID. 803(18)(B) (“A statement contained in a treatise, periodical, or
pamphlet [is not excluded by the rule against hearsay] if . . . the publication is established as
a reliable authority . . . by judicial notice.”).
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A. APOLOGISTS VERSUS RESTRICTIONISTS, STRONG CASES VERSUS
WEAK CASES

Much of the scholarly commentary on trademark infringement
has been described as aligning with either a restrictionist camp, i.e.,
those who want to weaken and restrict protections for senior marks,
or an apologist camp, i.e., those who want to support and expand
protections for senior marks.264 This Article is even-handed in that
debate. By creating a known-conservative version for plaintiffs and
alternate version for defendants, this Article leans to neither side.
However, this Article is not even-handed across all disputes. The
known-conservative approach introduces a headwind for parties
attempting to obtain supportive survey evidence. Effectively, this
headwind makes it more difficult to proffer supportive survey
evidence to the courts. Parties with a favorable marketplace
reality—i.e., substantial infringement for plaintiffs or trifling
infringement for defendants—will still be able to demonstrate their
cases with survey evidence. Indeed, considering the benefits of
using known-conservative methods described in Section VII.A.2
supra, parties with strong cases will be better off than before.
However, parties with an unfavorable marketplace reality—i.e.,
trifling infringement for plaintiffs or substantial infringement for
defendants—will be less able to obtain supportive survey evidence.
Parties with weak cases will not welcome this introduction of
known-conservative methods. Some may argue that by discouraging
weak cases from being brought to the courts, the knownconservative approach is too stringent, effectively making survey
evidence viable for only strong cases. Such an effect is best described
as an advantage, not a shortcoming. Weak cases should not be
strengthened by methodological artifacts.
B. JUDICIAL EVALUATIONS AFTER THE DAUBERT REVOLUTION

Even after 25 years, some commentators are critical of the
Daubert revolution.265 Those who wish to bolster their argument
264
See Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020,
2023–24 (2005) (comparing “restrictionist trademark commentary” with “trademark
apologists”).
265 See Krista M. Pikus, We The People: Juries, Not Judges, Should Be the Gatekeepers of
Expert Evidence, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 453, 469 (2014) (“A case that calls for an expert
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that federal trial judges should not have the gatekeeping role of
evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence may seize on the
results reported here and highlight that none of the judges in the
cases listed in Table 1 criticized the wording of the survey questions
or recognized the survey results were being influenced by response
effects. These commentators may interpret this lack of judicial
criticism—especially for something squarely in the judicial
wheelhouse, such as evaluating the questions posed to the quasiwitnesses participating in surveys266—as evidence that “amateur
scientists”267 cannot adequately evaluate the reliability of scientific
methods.
However, I argue that such an interpretation of the findings
reported here is unfair to judges. The differences between the
question wordings in Table 1 are subtle, and as I argued in Section
III.B.3 supra, even for apparently neutral wordings there are so
many potential response effects that it would be practically
impossible for anyone to predict a priori which response effects will
be actual and sizable. Unless the response effect is obvious and
egregious, only empirical testing can reveal whether a question has
response effects in comparison to alternatives. Going forward,
judges can and should easily incorporate the response effects
identified in this Article. This sort of incremental improvement in
the trial judge’s gatekeeping role built on improvements in
methodology is all anyone can reasonably expect.
C. ALLEGED INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE LAW AND SCIENCE

Throughout the scholarly legal commentary on expert witnesses
across all areas of expertise, one of the strongest threads is
lamentation about the strong bias that experts have toward the
party that hired them. In 1901, Judge (then Mr.) Learned Hand
wrote that expert witnesses have “the natural bias of one called . . .
to represent a single side and liberally paid to defend it. Human
witness does so because it requires specialized knowledge in that particular field. Unless a
judge coincidentally has expertise in that field, they are likely no better qualified than a jury
to assess such questions.”).
266 See supra notes 100 and 136.
267 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see generally David L. Faigman, Judges as ‘Amateur
Scientists’, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207 (1990).
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nature is too weak for that.”268 Almost 100 years later, a survey of
over 300 federal judges found their most common complaint about
expert testimony to be experts’ tendency to “abandon objectivity and
become advocates for the side that hired them.”269 The potential
solution most commonly suggested by courts and commentators is
to encourage courts to appoint neutral experts under Federal Rule
of Evidence 706.270 In addition, a variety of other solutions have
been suggested, including scientifically-trained magistrate
judges,271 appointing teams of two experts (one nominated by each
party) to “check and control each other”272 when writing a joint
expert report, and obligating experts to testify with little or no
compensation.273 Despite the many suggestions, the vast majority of
expert witnesses are still called by the parties,274 and commentators
still lament that experts are biased by partisan incentives.275
268 Billings Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 53 (1901).
269 Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding
Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 328 (2002).
270 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“Judges should be strongly encouraged to make greater use of their inherent authority to
appoint experts.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)); see also Stephen Breyer, The
Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE 24, 26 (1998) (discussing the use of
court-appointed experts to assist trial judges in improving their gatekeeping role); Learned
Hand, supra note 268, at 56 (“[M]y path has led to a board of experts or a single expert, not
called by either side, who shall advise the jury of the general propositions applicable to the
cause which lie within his province.”).
271 Edward V. Di Lello, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges at the
Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 473 (1993) (“Recognizing the need to expedite, de-mystify,
and where necessary curb or eliminate so-called ‘battles of experts’ involving technical subject
matter, this Note proposes the creation of a new adjunct judicial office for magistrate judges
who are specialists in technical fields.”).
272 Nils Schmidt-Ahrendts, Expert Teaming—Bridging the Divide between Party-Appointed
and Tribunal-Appointed Experts, 43 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 653, 658 (2012).
273 See Howard H. Kaufman, The Expert Witness. Neither Frey nor Daubert Solved the
Problem. What Can Be Done?, 15 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 79, 95 (2001)
(“Participation in the legal system should be both selective and obligatory, so that testifying
becomes an honor and a duty and is done by people with the greatest knowledge and integrity.
. . . In addition, fees should be limited, so that there is no financial motive that might bias the
expert.”).
274 Krafta et al., supra note 269, at 326 (conducting a survey of over 300 federal judges, of
which 73.9% reported they had never appointed a neutral expert for a case, and 77.9%
reported they had never appointed a special master with technical training to prepare a
report for the court).
275 See, e.g., W. William Hodes, Navigating Some Deep and Troubled Jurisprudential
Waters: Lawyer-Expert Witnesses and the Twin Dangers of Disguised Testimony and
Disguised Advocacy, 6 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 180 (2016) (“[T]he use of
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More fundamentally, there has been a discussion in the legal
literature about whether the adversarial system of justice is so
different from science in terms of philosophies, norms, and methods
that adversarialism and science are incompatible and
irreconcilable.276 As many observers have commented, the courts
are frequently disappointed with the scientific evidence they are
given.277 This is certainly true for survey-based evidence; courts say
they want insights about real-life consumers from surveys,278 but
courts are often harshly critical of the survey evidence they
receive.279 Some scholars suggest the courts are perennially
disappointed because they expect too much of science,280 and these

compensated, partisan expert witnesses poses significant dangers to the fair and just
determination of disputes.”).
276 See Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and
Law, 72 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 12 (2009) (“[I]t is hardly surprising that the legal system has
had trouble handling scientific testimony, for the legal culture could hardly be more different
. . . . Justice Blackmun writes in Daubert that there are ‘important differences between the
quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory.’ That’s putting it
mildly.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence,
73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1033 (2008) (“[T]hose who believe that we might ever fully resolve –
rather than imperfectly manage – the deep structural tensions surrounding both partisanship
and epistemic competence that permeate the use of scientific evidence within our legal system
are almost certainly destined for disappointment.”).
277 See L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1389, 1390–91 (1995) (“The disdain for experts comes from all quarters: judges, lawyers,
commentators, politicians, the media, and even experts themselves.”); see also supra notes
248–249.
278 See, e.g., Wreal LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-21385, 2015 WL 12550932, at
*15 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2015) (stating that survey evidence is “a standard form of evidence–
perhaps the standard form of evidence–on consumer perception in cases involving trademarks
and deceptive advertising.” (citations and quotations omitted)); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove
Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 793 n.4 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Survey evidence is often critically
important in the field of trademark law. We heartily embrace its use, so long as the survey
design is relevant to the legal issues, open-ended in its construction, and neutral in its
administration.”).
279 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 32:196 (“From the cases where survey evidence was
introduced, one senses that the trier of fact (from Patent and Trademark Office Examiner to
Court of Appeals Judge) sometimes views survey evidence of respondent’s state of mind with
something less than enthusiasm. Too often, the cases reveal an unwarranted hypercritical
attitude towards surveys. The criteria set for a ‘proper’ survey sometimes appear to be
impossible to meet.”).
280 See DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF
SCIENCE AND LAW, at xv (2006) (“[T]rial judges who have a romantic view of science tend,
alternately, to make two mistakes: sometimes they disallow good science because the
scientific expert does not live up to their idealistic image of science; and paradoxically,
sometimes they allow bad science on the basis of its social authority alone.”).
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impossible expectations trace back to a fundamental incompatibility
between adversarialism and science.281
This Article identifies a new way of limiting the influence of
possible partisan biases among expert witnesses. More
fundamentally, this Article identifies a new way of resolving the
apparent incompatibility of adversarialism and science. When
partisan biases and empirical methodologies are properly aligned
with one another, competitive incentives push parties to increase
the reliability of their scientific evidence. When aligned and
harnessed together, adversarialism and science are highly
compatible. The necessary tool for creating and maintaining this
alignment is introduced here as the known-conservative approach.
This Article focuses on defining known-conservative versions for the
Ever-Ready method, but the basic approach demonstrated here can
be readily applied to other methods of survey research and even
other types of empirical research. In this way, the knownconservative approach can increase the evidentiary reliability of
expert witness testimony in a variety of settings.
D. CONCLUSION

The Ever-Ready method has long been seen by the courts as the
“gold standard”282 of measuring consumer confusion as to the source
of a product or service. This Article has presented empirical
281 See M. Neil Browne et al., The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts,
36 AM. BUS. L. J. 1, 37 (1998) (“The expectations, goals, demands and general culture of the
legal system and those of scientific research in general are purportedly incongruous.”); id. at
37 n.190 (“This discrepancy works both ways. The legal system may require more from science
than it can honestly give and that same judiciary system may settle for far less because of
external constraints of time and money.”); H. Keith Hunt, Presidential Address: On the
Professional Integrity of Our Expert Witnesses, in 7 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 1, 1
(Jerry C. Olson ed., 1980) (“[T]he adversary process and the scholarly process are two quite
different processes for arriving at truth. Each is useful and effective in its own sphere.”). The
conclusion that science and law may be fundamentally incompatible is not new. After
reviewing the legal commentary from the late-nineteenth century, Professor Jennifer
Mnookin found comments that, compared with today, “feel remarkably familiar: confidence
that scientific evidence ought to be capable of providing especially critical and reliable
evidence within legal disputes, coupled with a great deal of frustration with the actual,
practical use of expert evidence in court,” Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and
Demonizing Experts: An Intellectual History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILLANOVA L. REV. 763,
766 (2007), leading some of those early commentators to conclude “the incremental nature of
science and the adversarial process of the common law system were a poor fit.” Id. at 799.
282 E.g., Wreal, LLC., No. 1:14-CV-21385, 2016 WL 8793317, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2016).
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evidence that this gold standard has long been in dire need of
refinement, and this Article has presented further empirical testing
that performs such a refinement. The result is empirically validated
wording for the first Ever-Ready question that should be used by
plaintiffs who wish to demonstrate that confusion is commonplace
among consumers (“If you have an opinion, what company or
companies provide this product?”) and wording that should be used
by defendants who wish to demonstrate that confusion is rare
among consumers (“Based on what you saw in the image, what
company do you think makes this brand? Please be as specific as
possible in your answer.”). In the process, this Article has sought to
establish a new approach—the “Known-Conservative” approach—
that can be applied more generally to scientific evidence in the
courtroom.
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